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LABOR LAW-LABOR'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS MAY REST 
ON THE HAUNCHES OF A RAT: 29 U.S.c. § 158(B)(4)(n)(B) AND 
THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT RULE 
But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at 
what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of 
human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is 
equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they 
can, and the weak grant what they must. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Organized labor is fighting for its collective life.2 Congres­
sional impotence, ossified labor laws, and a National Labor Rela­
tions Board that is more interested in protecting corporate interests 
than in allowing working Americans an equal footing, have all led 
to this current demise.3 However, recent years have witnessed the 
development of organized labor's new and innovative economic 
tool to bring attention to a labor dispute or to protest unjust social 
conditions.4 The tactic involves displaying a large rubber rat, 
twenty to thirty feet in height, across the street from a secondary 
1. Thucydides, The History of Thucydides Book V, in 2 HISTORIANS OF GREECE 
207, 296 (T.M. Alexander ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1909). The above quote oc­
curred as part of a justice debate between the Athenian Army and the weaker, over­
matched island-state of Melos prior to an invasion in which the entire Melian 
population was either murdered or enslaved. !d. at 294-305. During negotiations, the 
Athenians demanded unconditional surrender to enslavement. Id. at 295. The Melians 
responded by appealing to the much vaunted Athenian sense of social and moral jus­
tice. Id. The Athenians countered with the aforementioned retort, which articulates a 
theory of justice that continues presently. !d. at 296. This Machiavellian doctrine of 
justice has proven to be a sad prophecy in the course of human relations, and unfortu­
nately remains acutely prevalent to this day-a doctrine that abdicates justice as a 
moral right and turns it into something that the powerful grant to the weak if it serves 
them. See id. at 294-306; see also STANLEY ROSEN, PLATO'S REPUBLIC: A STUDY 43 
(2005). 
2. Max Fraser, Beyond the Labor Board, NATION, Jan. 21, 2008, at 6, 6-8; see also 
Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membership in 2007 (Jan. 25, 2008), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm (stating that private sector union mem­
bership is down to 7.5%). 
3. Fraser, supra note 2, at 6-8. 
4. See Alan Feuer, Labor's Huge Rubber Rat, Caught in a Legal Maze, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at Bl; see also Jessica Marquez, Unions' Inflatable Rat an Endan­
gered Species, WORKFORCE MGMT., Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.workforce.com!section/ 
00/article/24/15/94.html. 
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employer that is doing business with a company with whom the 
union has a labor dispute with.5 The iconography of the rat display 
not only allows the unions a powerfully succinct announcement of a 
labor dispute-but does so with a viscerally eye-catching symbol 
that demands public attention. 
For example, imagine that a labor organization has a labor dis­
pute with Company A (a company that employs nonunion employ­
ees and pays below-scale wages for the industry). Further imagine 
that Company A is working for a "neutral" employer, Company B 
(e.g., installing an air conditioning unit). The labor organization 
will position the rat outside of Company B's place of business to 
bring attention to the labor dispute with Company A, and to per­
suade the general public not to do business with either Company A 
or Company B.6 The rat might have a sign attached, perhaps stat­
ing, "Company A is Unfair to Working People because ...." In 
addition, the labor organization will also have one or two members 
standing in front of the rat with handbills that further articulate the 
dispute. The hope is that the rat will draw attention to the handbil­
lers, thus allowing more information to be disseminated to the pub­
lic.? This makes it difficult for Company A to continue doing 
business as usual within the community. Union organizers have 
stated that people are more inclined to ask questions about the 
campaign when a giant rat is located at the scene.s 
The issue that this Note analyzes is whether the peaceful dis­
play of an inflatable rubber rat by organized labor at a neutral em­
ployer, for the purposes of disseminating information concerning a 
labor dispute with a business partner of that employer, is a violation 
5. See, e.g., Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251 (2006); Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 n.3 (2006), 
enforcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
6. This example is an amalgamation of two recent cases in which unions have 
used the rat in labor disputes. The facts have been altered to bring to light the sole 
issue of this Note, which is primarily the use of the rat, not the supplemental activity 
that arose in these cases. See generally Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. at 
1251; Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3. In addition, it should be noted that if the 
union displayed the rat at the primary employer's place of business, such conduct would 
be legal pursuant to the "area standards" exception. See generally 2 SECTION OF LA. 
BOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE 
BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1569-81 (Patrick 
Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW] (discussing 
area standards parameters). 
7. See Feuer, supra note 4; Marquez, supra note 4. 
8. See Feuer, supra note 4; Marquez, supra note 4; see also Laborers' E. Region 
Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. at 1261 (stating that union officials testified that the use of the 
rat was to articulate a labor dispute or "aid in protesting social issues."). 
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of the secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations 
Act (Act or NLRA) or, conversely, is protected as an exercise of 
free speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.9 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)\O has 
had two recent opportunities to pass judgment on the lawfulness of 
the display,11 On both occasions, the Board found that the unions 
were participating in other proscribed conduct, thus allowing the 
question of the display to go unanswered.12 It is worth noting that 
in both cases, the NLRB's General Counsel and the Administrative 
Law Judges (ALJ) found the display to violate § 158(b)(4).13 Re­
cently, the General Counsel was forced to abandon one of those 
claims in light of a review by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit,14 However, because the D.C. Circuit's decision in Sheet 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I; 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000). 
10. The NLRB is the governing administrative agency that rules on cases involv­
ing the NLRA, effectively creating labor law in the United States. Ii is made up of a 
five-member panel appointed by the President. BRUCE S. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE 
TO LABOR LAW 9 (4th ed. 2000). However, Board decisions may be appealed to the 
circuit court of appeals. The terms of a circuit decision are binding upon the Board only 
for that particular case. Because of the lack of uniformity within circuit decisions, the 
Board is not obligated to accept these decisions as precedent. THE DEVELOPING LA­
BOR LAW, supra note 6, at 2597-98. 
11. See Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3; Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 
346 N.L.R.B. at 1253. Recently the D.C. Circuit reviewed the Board's enforcement 
order in Sheet Metal I and remanded the case back to the Board for a decision on issues 
not addressed. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB (Sheet Metal II), 
491 F.3d 429, 440 (D.C. CiT. 2007). 
12. Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3; Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 
N.L.R.B. at 1253. 
13. In both of the most recent rat cases, the AUs followed lockstep with the 
General Counsel's legal theory that the rat is coercive and a form of "signal picketing," 
which supported the unfair labor practice charge. See Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 
346 N.L.R.B. at 1265 (AU Davis's ruling that the display is proscriptive because it 
"would reasonably be understood by the employees as a signal or request to engage in a 
work stoppage" (quoting Teamsters Local 122, 334 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1191 (2001))); see 
also Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 206 (holding that the display of the rat violates 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) because of its "coercive" nature, thus interfering with business of the 
secondary employer). 
14. See General Counsel's Statement of Position to the Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. 
at 8, Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 346 N.L.R.B. 199 (2006) 
[hereinafter Position Statement] (on file with the Western New England Law Review) 
(acquiescing that the rat display did not violate the Act in this instance because the 
Board must "accept the court's opinion as the law of the case"). While the D.C. Circuit 
did not rule specifically on the legality of the rat, it was clear that the General Counsel 
interpreted the court's decision (and dicta) as allowing the peaceful display under 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)-at least within the jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit. ld. As a result, 
the General Counsel advised the Board that the display of the rat would be upheld in 
the D.C. Circuit. Thus the charges against it should be dismissed. ld. at 9-13. Whether 
or not the Board decides to accept this recommendation is yet to be determined at the 
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Metal Workers' International Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB is not bind­
ing precedent on the Board, and given the divergent opinions 
within the General Counsel's office, the issue of whether the dis­
play of the rat has First Amendment protections remains unan­
swered with regard to Board law.15 
This novel tactic of displaying a rat at a secondary employer's 
place of business has been brought in response to a bourgeoning 
workforce crisis in this country. Union membership is at an all time 
low, and workers (union and nonunion alike) are working longer 
hours and increasing their production-but being paid less.16 As a 
result, corporations are enjoying one of the greatest eras of profit­
ability in the history of capitalism, given that "wages and salaries 
now make up [the] lowest share of [the] nation's gross domestic 
product since the government began recording" this informationP 
This Note makes three propositions: First, the use of the rat 
does not violate the Act. The display of the rat is neither picketing 
in the traditional sense of the word, nor is it "signal picketing," a 
tactic that secretly communicates to other union members that a 
picket line is present, thus instructing employees of the secondary 
publishing of this Note. Further, whether the General Counsel will decide to revive its 
previous theory concerning the illegality of the rat in another case or more specifically 
in another circuit remains to be seen. 
15. Compare Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 (using expansive language to de­
termine what constitutes picketing), and Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, Nat'! Labor Relations Bd., to Roberto Chavarry, 
Reg'l Dir., Region 13, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. (Feb. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Advice 
Memorandum], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ Advice %20Memos/2006/ 
13-CC-2584.pdf ("[A] rat is a well-known symbol of a labor dispute and is a signal to 
third persons that there is an invisible picket line they should not cross."), and Richard 
A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(b) 
of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 924 (2005) (dis­
cussing that the NLRB's General Counsel believes that the use of the rat is proscribed), 
and Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful Secondary 
Picket Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REv. 1519, 1521 (2006) (stating that the NLRB's General Counsel has filed charges 
against unions that have used the rat), with Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39 (calling 
into question the Board's legal reasoning concerning what is constitutes picketing and 
coercive behavior); and supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
16. See Steven Greenhouse & David Leonhardt, Real Wages Fail to Match a Rise 
in Productivity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 14867117 
(Westlaw) (noting that current wages do match inflation rates and represent the "lowest 
share of G.D.P. on record: 45.3%"); Dan Hurley, Today's Labor Woes Echo Through 
U.S. History, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 1,2006, at C1, available at 2006 WLNR 15376385 
(Westlaw); see also Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 2 (stating that private sector 
union membership is down to 7.5%). 
17. See Greenhouse & Leonhardt, supra note 16. 
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employer not to cross.l8 Second, the rat is an expressive symbol of 
speech because it articulates a labor dispute. Thus any suppression 
of the display would violate the union's First Amendment rights 
secured under the Constitution.19 Finally, the rat exemplifies a vital 
balancing mechanism in a radically disparate situation, and finding 
that the rat violates the Act would be contrary to the pursuit of 
industrial peace and justice-the cornerstones of American labor 
policy.20 
Part LA will begin with a brief look at the history and purpose 
of the Act. Part LB will examine the secondary boycott provision 
of the statute in an attempt to understand the activities that Con­
gress intended the Act to prohibit. Thereafter, Parts LC-E will ex­
plore the tenuous relationship that exists between the NLRA and 
the First Amendment. Part I will start with an examination of the 
Supreme Court's understanding of labor picketing in NLRB v. Fruit 
& Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits).21 It 
will culminate with the Court's articulation of handbilling in Ed­
ward 1. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Con­
struction Trades Council (DeBartolo /l).22 
As part of this exploration, Part I.E will also examine the way 
in which the Court's most recent use of the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine has only furthered the confusion of understanding how the 
First Amendment is applied to organized labor's use of picketing 
and the dissemination of information. Concluding the background 
portion, Part II will illustrate what symbols are considered to be 
speech and why. 
Finally, through examining other related symbolic speech 
cases, Part lILA will propose that the display should be judged us­
18. These are the central themes that the General Counsel and the AUs rely on 
in both of the most recent rat cases. See Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 
at 1264-65; Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 206 (holding the coerciveness of the activity 
to be more dispositive than the signal effect); see also supra note 13 and accompanying 
text. 
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech ...."). 
20. See Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can 
We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 142 (2003); Richard N. Block et al., An Introduction to 
the Current State of Workers' Rights, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 2 (Richard N. Block 
et al. eds., 2006). 
21. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree 
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 59-61 (1964). 
22. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council 
(DeBartolo l/), 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
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ing the strict-scrutiny analysis due to the inherent political nature of 
the speech and that any suppression would amount to an improper 
restriction of the content of the speech. In conclusion, Parts III.B­
D will illustrate, unequivocally, the legality of the display under 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA through case law, statutory con­
struction, and policy initiatives under the Act. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT: 

LABOR'S STRUGGLE TO KEEP PACE 

A. 	 The History and Purpose of the National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 
The NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, was passed in 1935 
amid a national political and economic crisis.23 In an era of eco­
nomic dissolution, upheaval, strife, and violence, Senator Robert 
Wagner introduced a bill that attempted to bring justice to the 
working people and, consequently, industrial peace to the United 
States.24 Though wildly unpopular with the corporate power struc­
ture, Senator Wagner understood that "[d]emocracy cannot work 
unless it is honored in the factory as well as the polling booth; 
[workers] cannot be truly free in body and in spirit unless their free­
dom extends into places where they earn their daily bread."25 
While desire for industrial and social peace was the genesis of 
such radical legislation, the Act also represented an attempt to in­
fuse a semblance of equality into the relationship between the com­
mercial power structure and the American worker.26 Corporate 
avarice, substandard wages, and poverty provided fertile ground for 
Communist revolutionaries. Therefore, one could speculate that 
the passage of the Act was, in some ways, an attempt to "de-com­
modify" the labor force, thus offering the American worker some 
justice, surplus labor value, and bargaining power against the back­
23. WALTER E. OBERER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: COL­
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 99 (5th ed. 2002). 
24. See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,23 n.2, 34 
(1937) (discussing how one purpose of the Act was to promote industrial justice and 
"seek to make appropriate collective action of employees an instrument of peace rather 
than of strife" (emphasis added)). The Act was largely enacted, in the midst of the 
Great Depression, to allow workers the right to collectively organize as a means to 
quell not only economic dissolution but also the "mounting strike crisis" in American 
labor. HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM TIlE WAGNER ACT TO TAIT­
HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 19-29 
(1950). 
25. Block et aI., supra note 20, at 1 (quoting Senator Robert Wagner). 
26. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1965). 
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drop of an overwhelmingly powerful corporate policy arrange­
menU7 Justice Stewart articulated this point concisely, stating that 
the "primary purpose of the [NLRA] was to redress the perceived 
imbalance of economic power between labor and management."28 
Prior to the Wagner Act, workers possessed no tangible rights 
to form unions or collectively bargain,29 While the NLRA has un­
dergone numerous changes throughout its history, its basic purpose 
remains intact: to restore competitive balance to an area of inherent 
disparity and to promote industrial peace and justice.30 
B. The Curse of § J58(b)(4)(U) (B) 
One of the more challenging endeavors for labor law scholars 
and practitioners is the interpretation of the secondary boycott pro­
vision of the NLRA, codified at 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).31 
Much of this difficulty stems from the fact that the Act does not 
articulate exactly what a secondary boycott is or the types of union 
conduct concerning secondary employers are specifically prohib­
ited.32 Instead, the Act provides tortured and vague language that 
attempts to regulate union conduct as it pertains to secondary activ­
ity involving a neutral employer.33 
27. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 
71 (1975); HENRY PELLlNG, AMERICAN LABOR 126-27 (1960). See generally KARL 
MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (Friedrich En­
gels ed., Samuel Moore trans., 1888) (1848), reprinted in THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 7, 7-28 (George Stade ed., 2005). At the risk of oversimplifying 
Marxist theory, it was posited that the unorganized "incoherent mass" of workers 
would eventually rise to revolution, thus breaking the chains of industrialized enslave­
ment. However, the codification of the NLRA that allowed workers to collectively 
bargain gave workers a state-sanctioned increase value of their surplus labor possibly 
not envisioned by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto. See id. 
28. Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 316. 
29. FELDACKER, supra note 10, at 2-3; OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 99-100. 
Prior to the NLRA, the Railway Labor Act recognized the right of employees to form 
unions and bargain collectively, but only extended those rights to railway and airline 
employees. See FELDACKER, supra note 10, at 2-3. 
30. Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 316; OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 99-100. 
31. See Bock, supra note 14, at 905-07. 
32. Id. at 907-08. Additionally, it should be noted that the proceeding examina­
tion in no way is an attempt at comprehensive examination of this section of the statute. 
Such an endeavor is the sole subject of numerous scholarly writings. This Note tries to 
untangle the matrix of § 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B) only enough to analyze the use of the inflat­
able rat as a means of disseminating information to the public at large. Admittedly 
there are a multitude of corollaries that one could embark on given this scenario­
those are left to other scholars, for a different day. 
33. The relevant section of the Act states: 
(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents­
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In trying to define the contours of a secondary boycott, Judge 
Learned Hand's description remains one of the more concise 
definitions: 
"The gravamen of a secondary boycott ... is that its sanctions 
bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, 
but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to 
compel him to stop [doing] business with the employer in the 
hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employ­
ees' demands."34 
Applying § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) to union conduct toward a secon­
dary employer has not been a simple task for either the NLRB or 
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by 
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to 
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, 
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any 
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or 
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in 
an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof 
is­
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, han­
dling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any 
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi­
ness with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other em­
ployer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the 
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has 
been certified as the representative of such employees ... ; 
... Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, 
nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit public­
ity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, 
including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product 
or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organiza­
tion has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as 
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual 
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of 
his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or 
not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged 
in such distribution .... 
29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4) (2000). 
34. Howard Lesnik, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 
1363, 1363 (1962) (emphasis added) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of EIec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950». With all due respect to the venerable Judge Hand, this 
statement is archaic and misleading. To say that an employer has no concern or respon­
sibility in the type of people it hires offers a veil of protection that appear incongruous 
with the goal of the NLRA of establishing industrial peace. Should a secondary em­
ployer be abrogated of responsibility when its employees are committing illegal or im­
moral acts? 
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the courtS.35 Stated in its simplest form, § 158(b)( 4)(i) prohibits un­
ions from "engaging in a strike or other form of work stoppage; and 
. . . inducing or encouraging certain individuals to do the same 
thing."36 Section 158(b)( 4)(ii) makes it unlawful "to threaten, co­
erce or restrain any person" in the course of business of the secon­
dary employer.J7 However, if the aim of the union conduct is to 
"force or require one person to cease doing business with another 
person," and that person is a neutral employer, such activity will 
usually be held to violate the Act if a neutral employer is 
involved.38 
Section 158(b)(4)(ii) was added in 1959 as part of the Labor­
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (also known as the 
Landrum-Griffin Act).39 The Landrum-Griffin Act was enacted 
primarily to close "loopholes" left open by the previous version of 
the statute, which allowed picketing at secondary sites with the tar­
get being supervisors and customers.40 Fundamentally, the Su­
preme Court has interpreted the amendments to protect neutral 
employers from being dragged into labor disputes that are not of 
their own making.41 
35. See DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 251-52 (2d ed. 
2005). 
36. See Bock, supra note 14, at 917. 
37. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Basically, the first section of § 158(b)(4)(i) per­
tains to union conduct that appeals to the neutral company's employees, other unions, 
workers, delivery people, etc. not to deal with the secondary employer. See also Bock, 
supra note 14, at 913-16. For there to be violation of § 158(b)(4)(i), the union conduct 
must, in some way, overtly call or signal for a work stoppage by employees of the secon­
daryemployer. While § 158(b)(4)(i) primarily concerns appeals to workers associated 
with the secondary employer, § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) encompasses everyone else that en­
gages in business with the secondary employer. [d. 
38. Lee Modjeska, The Tree Fruits Consumer Picketing Case-A Retrospective 
Analysis, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1984). 
39. [d.; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 49-50, 58-59. 
40. Prior to 1959, prohibited activity only applied to statutorily defined employ­
ees and employers. See Bock, supra note 14, at 913. Moreover, the previous 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) did not proscribe any type of activity pertaining to supervisors, man­
agement, or the general public. See id. at 917; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 
supra note 6, at 1627 (discussing Senator Kennedy's comments that the main goal of the 
Landrum-Griffin amendments was to close loopholes left open for secondary boycotts 
in the Act). 
41. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1008 ("The section embodies 'the dual con­
gressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to 
bear on offending employers in primary' labor disputes and of shielding unoffending 
employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.'" (quoting NLRB 
v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 692 
(1951))). 
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In addition to closing the loopholes that allowed unions to 
picket, strike, or boycott secondary employers, Congress also at­
tempted to preserve organized labor's ability to communicate labor 
disputes to the public at large.42 In doing so, Congress attached a 
publicity proviso to try to curb potential constitutional questions 
that would inevitably arise as a result of proscribing all activity at a 
secondary location.43 
The proviso allows "truthful· handbills and similar forms of 
publicity-but not picketing-[to] be employed [by unions] to in­
form consumers generally" that products subject to a labor dispute 
are being distributed by the secondary employer.44 However, pub­
licity allowed under the proviso is subject to several limitations. 
These include the requirement that publicity must not '''have an 
effect of inducing' an employee, other than an employee of the pri­
mary employer, to refuse to perform his or her duties."45 Moreo­
ver, the publicity used to articulate a labor dispute cannot be 
"threaten[ing], coerc[ive] or restrain[ing]" to "any person" doing 
business with the secondary employer.46 
The aforementioned amendments and proviso are the result of 
much debate, which may explain why the language and history of 
the provision have been subject to such varying interpretations.47 
There are a multitude of circumstances that could potentially chal­
lenge the interpretation of "threaten, coerce, or restrain."48 In rela­
tion to § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), defining what violates the Act­
specifically the idioms "handbill" and "picket"-has been the cause 
of much confusion and litigation.49 
In essence, the plain wording of § 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B) protects sec­
ondary employers from most types of picketing. This includes in­
terfering with employees of the secondary employer and 
discouraging consumers with picket lines.50 As Professor Modjeska 
points out, "The clear congressional understanding appears to have 
42. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1628. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 1629. 
45. Id. (emphasis added). 
46. See id. at 1630 (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)); see also OBERER ET AL., 
supra note 23, at 403. 
47. See Bock, supra note 14, at 907-16 (discussing the various amendments and 
provisos added by Congress and the difficulty of defining secondary boycott). 
48. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii). 
49. See generally Bock, supra note 14, at 918-24 (discussing the difficulties of la­
bor practitioners dealing with § 158(b)(4)(ii) issues). 
50. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1031-32. 
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been that the mere existence of a consumer picket line imposed a 
threat of business loss that would tend to restrain and coerce the 
secondary employer, thereby exerting pressure on the secondary to 
cease doing business with the primary employer."51 Because pick­
eting has been generally interpreted as being restraining and coer­
cive to the secondary employer, consumer picketing at a secondary 
employer has been prohibited, with the exception of very limited 
circumstances.52 What constitutes a picket line as well as the consti­
tutionality of such a proscription will be explored in the ensuing 
sections.53 
This is not to say that the union cannot publicly disseminate 
issues of a labor dispute with a primary employer at a secondary 
site pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).54 In the seminal case of Edward 
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction 
Trades Council (DeBartolo II), the Supreme Court examined a situ­
ation in which union members distributed informational handbills 
to shopping mall customers that detailed the specifics of a labor 
dispute with a company doing construction inside the complex.55 
The secondary employer (the mall) filed an unfair labor practice 
petition alleging that the handbilling was proscribed conduct under 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).56 The Court, however, rejected this argument, 
and held that peaceful hand billing did not rise to the level of being 
coercive, threatening, or restraining under the language of the stat­
ute.57 DeBartolo II held that such a proscription had the potential 
to raise serious First Amendment concerns; thus, it chose to avoid 
those concerns by assuming that Congress intended not to prohibit 
peaceful handbilling at secondary sites. 58 Herein lies the curse of 
51. Id. at 1032. 
52. There are some types of consumer picketing allowed at secondary sites. The 
Court in Tree Fruits allowed consumer picketing constrained only to the struck product 
in limited situations. [d. at 1005. This case will be explored in more detail in the subse­
quent section. See infra Part I.e.1. 
53. See discussion in infra Part I.D. 
54. See generally Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council (DeBartolo 11), 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988) (holding that peaceful 
handbilling at the mall did not rise to level of picketing). 
55. [d. at 570-71. For an in-depth discussion of DeBartolo 11 see infra Part I.E.1. 
56. [d. at 571-72. 
57. [d. at 578. The Court used the proviso merely as a clarifying agent and not 
the foundation, which allowed handbilling. See Bock, supra note 14, at 923. 
58. DeBartolo 11, 485 U.S. at 575; see also Overstreet v. United Bhd. of 
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Thomas e. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First 
Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 171 
(1990). 
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§ 158(b)( 4 )(ii)-that is, attempting to predict which behavior trips 
the "coercive" hatch-door within the statute and, thus, turns speech 
into proscriptive conduct. 
C. 	 Tree Fruits to Safeco: The Evolution of Consumer Picketing 
and the Tension with the First Amendment 
1. 	 Tree Fruits 
In 1964 the Supreme Court was confronted with a consumer 
picketing case that, by all accounts, should not have been as re­
markable as it turned out to be.59 In Tree Fruits, the union picketed 
a grocery chain that sold the apples of the company with which it 
was engaged in a labor dispute.6o The union distributed handbills, 
carried picket signs, and peacefully asked that customers not buy 
the struck product.61 The Board read the statute and the proviso 
literally and found "that such picketing always threatens, coerces or 
restrains the secondary employer."62 However, in a "virtuoso per­
formance," the Court held that § 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B) "was not in­
tended to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary 
sites."63 Within the calculus of the majority's decision was Justice 
Brennan's "concern" that such an outright "ban against peaceful 
59. 	 See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1005-06. 
60. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree 
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 59-61 (1964). Union officials for Local 760 called a strike against 
the Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee Inc. Id. at 59-60. To call attention to its 
labor dispute with the company, the union called for a consumer boycott of the apples 
that Tree Fruits was selling. Id. In consequence, the union peacefully picketed and 
distributed handbills to consumers at Safeway grocery stores urging customers not to 
purchase Tree Fruits apples. Id. at 61. 
61. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1012-13. It should be added that the union 
only requested consumers not to buy Tree Fruits apples. Id. at 1012. The picketers 
made no attempt to block entrances or intimidate employees of Safeway not to work. 
Id. at 1013. In fact, at locations in which stores were located at the end of a parking lot, 
the union picketed and hand billed from the public sidewalks to further lessen intimida­
tion. Id. at 1013-14; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1634. 
62. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 62. The section of the statute that the Board read 
literally was subsection B. Id. at 59 (citing 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B». Section 
158(b)(4) states, in pertinent part, that "[n]othing contained in ... paragraph [4] shall 
be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully 
advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization." 29 
U.S.c. § 158(b)(4) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Board interpreted the statute 
and the legislative history to ban any consumer picketing at secondary sites. Tree 
Fruits, 377 U.S. at 61-62. 
63. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1006, 1015; see also Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72 
("[I]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not 
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 
(quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892))). 
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picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First 
Amendment. "64 
The Court examined the legislative history of the Landrum­
Griffin Act and concluded that, despite the language, the congres­
sional debates did "not reflect with requisite clarity a congressional 
plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary 
sites."65 What Congress did seek to prohibit was the "isolated evil" 
of using the picket line to persuade customers to stop trading with 
the secondary employer, thus forcing it to cease doing business with 
the primary target.66 Because the union was only concentrating its 
campaign against Tree Fruits Company's apples, and because it was 
not asking Safeway customers or employees to completely boycott 
the store, the activity did not fall within what Congress sought to 
proscribe.67 Because there was no attempt to shut off all trade with 
the secondary employer, the Court "distinguished 'peaceful con­
sumer picketing to shut off all trade' ... which creates 'a separate 
dispute with the secondary employer,' from picketing that 'only 
persuades his customers not to buy the struck product' and is 
closely confined to the primary dispute."68 This "unity of interest" 
versus the "primary boycott" distinction is the theoretical hinge 
that the Court relies upon in creating an exception for consumer 
picketing of a struck product.69 
Coupling the statutory language that allows "publicity, other 
than picketing" with Senator John F. Kennedy's explanation of the 
committee compromise (which appears to follow lock-step with the 
statute), leaves one puzzled as to why the Court chose its strained 
and attenuated syllogistic pathJo Senator Kennedy clarified that 
the purpose of adding the proviso to the statute was to protect 
"[T]he right to appeal to consumers by methods other than pick­
eting asking them to refrain from buying goods made by nonun­
ion labor and to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells 
such goods. . .. We were not able to persuade the House confer­
ees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but were 
able to persuade them to agree that the union shall be free to 
64. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63. 
65. /d. 
66. [d. 
67. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1014. 
68. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1634-35; Modjeska, supra 
note 38, at 1016. 
69. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1016-17. 
70. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other words 
... all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing . ..."71 
However, Justice Black's concurrence in Tree Fruits gives in­
sight into the motive behind such creative statutory construction.72 
In his opinion, Justice Black agreed with the dissent that the word­
ing of the statute is clear in that it "forbid [ s] the striking employees 
of one business to picket the premises of a neutral business where 
the purpose of the picketing is to persuade customers ... not to buy 
goods supplied by the struck employer. "73 Justice Black diverged 
from this path and aligned with the majority, suggesting that such a 
blanket prohibition of consumer picketing would most certainly vi­
olate the First Amendment in that it "abridges freedom of speech 
and press. "74 
Moreover, the concurrence analogized Tree Fruits to Thornhill 
v. Alabama, in which the Court struck down a statute that banned 
all picketing because "[t]he sweeping and inexact terms of the ordi­
nance disclose[ d) the threat to freedom of speech inherent in its 
existence."75 While Justice Black acquiesced to the notion that 
picketing involves a semblance of conduct,76 he also recognized that 
it is infused with constitutionally protected speech.?7 In cases 
where regulation of the former will likely impede the latter, "it is 
the duty of the courts ... 'to weigh the circumstances and to ap­
praise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the 
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights' of speech and 
press."78 
The concurrence furthers the argument by stating: 
Even assuming that the Federal Government has power to bar or 
otherwise regulate patrolling by persons on local streets or adja­
cent to local business[es] ... it is difficult to see that the section in 
question intends to do anything but prevent dissemination of in­
71. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 70 (second emphasis added) (quoting 105 CONGo REC. 
S16,414 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 2 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE 
ACT OF 1959, at 1432 (1959) [hereinafter 2 NLRB]). 
72. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1016-18 (showing the attenuation between 
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions). 
73. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 76 (Black, J., concurring). 
74. Id. 
75. [d. at 77 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940». 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 78 (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939». 
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formation about the facts of a labor dispute-a right protected by 
the First Amendment.79 
If the picketers advocated unlawful action, or if the government ar­
gued that the speech should be minimally regulated, there might 
have been more leniency in the analysis from the concurring voice 
of the Court.80 
In sum, the Tree Fruits majority understood the serious consti­
tutional implications of proscribing all consumer picketing and, de­
spite the wording of §158(b)(4)(ii)(B), fashioned a creative path of 
least resistance to avoid them.81 In doing so, the majority and the 
concurrence of the Court expressed an awareness of the existing 
constitutional pitfalls that lie in wait should the Court enjoin all 
consumer picketing at a secondary site. 
2. Sa/eco 
Twenty-four years after Tree Fruits, the Court revisited the sec­
ondary consumer product-picketing issue in NLRB v. Retail Store 
Employees Union, LocallOOl (Sa/eco). In Sa/eco the union had a 
labor dispute with the Safeco Title Insurance Company.82 The 
union picketed the local title companies that did business with 
Safeco.83 While the case seemed very similar to Tree Fruits, the 
Court distinguished Tree Fruits on the ground that five of the com­
panies picketed received over ninety percent of their business from 
the sale of Safeco insurance.84 
In a plurality decision, the Court distinguished the allowable 
struck product in Tree Fruits from the struck product in Sa/eco 
79. [d. (emphasis added); see also Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102 ("[T]he dissemina­
tion of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within 
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."). 
80. Justice Black opined in his concurring opinion that there was no other reason 
to prevent the picketers other than silencing their message. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 78­
79. There were no arguments made that the legislature passed the statute in an attempt 
to protect the people from breach of the peace or violence. Rather, the section "is 
aimed at outlawing free discussion of one side of a certain kind of labor dispute and 
cannot be sustained as a permissible regulation of patrolling." [d. at 79. 
81. /d. at 72 (majority opinion); see also Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1016. See 
generally OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 440-41. The editors pose the question of 
whether the Court chose to alter the meaning of the statute in order to circumvent the 
more pressing constitutional question. 
82. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeeo), 447 U.S. 607, 
609 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
83. [d. at 609-10. 
84. [d. at 609; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 
23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57,85-86 (2002). 
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where "the struck product constitute[ d] the sole or central product 
of the secondary employer."85 Noncoercive consumer picketing 
limited to a struck product (as in Tree Fruits), becomes coercive 
when picketing the struck product forces the neutral company to 
shut off business with the primary employer embroiled in the labor 
dispute.86 Thus, the Court created a new wrinkle in the test for 
consumer-product picketing; consumer-product picketing will be 
deemed coercive if it "is 'reasonably calculated to induce customers 
not to patronize neutral parties at all.' "87 In cases falling between 
the factual poles of Tree Fruits and Safeco, the Court instructed 
lower courts to examine "whether ... the secondary appeal is rea­
sonably likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial 
10ss."88 This type of analysis is aptly referred to as the "merged­
product doctrine. "89 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens acknowledged that serious 
constitutional issues lurked beneath the surface of this case, stating, 
"The constitutional issue, however, is not quite as easy as the plu­
rality would make it seem."90 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens found 
the restriction constitutional, stating, "Like so many other kinds of 
expression, picketing is a mixture of conduct and communication. 
In the labor context, it is the conduct element rather than the partic­
ular idea being expressed that often provides the most persuasive 
deterrent to third persons about to enter a business 
establishment."91 
Cognizant of the delicate balance between the union's First 
Amendment rights and the desire to protect neutrals from coercion, 
Justice Stevens focused on the conduct component of the picket, 
85. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1020. 
86. The Court held that because this type of action left the neutral employers 
with no viable choice "between their survival and the severance of their ties with 
Safeco, the picketing plainly violate[ d the] statutory ban on the coercion of neutrals." 
Safeco, 447 U.S. at 615; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1635­
36; Fisk, supra note 84, at 85-86; Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1020. 
87. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 
226 N.L.R.B. 754, 757 (1976), rev'd, 447 U.S. 607 (1980». This explanation by no 
means attempted to articulate the complexities of deciphering the doctrines associated 
with product picketing. It only attempted to illustrate the basic evolution of the Court's 
philosophy regarding consumer picketing and the tension posed by the First Amend­
ment. For a more detailed articulation on the parameters of product picketing, see THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1634-36. 
88. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 615 n.l1. 
89. See Bock, supra note 14, at 955. 
90. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
91. Id. at 618-19 (emphasis added). 
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rather than the particular idea being disseminated stating, 
'''[p]icketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since 
it involves patrol of a particular locality.' "92 Justice Stevens differ­
entiated between a customer's response to conduct and the cus­
tomer's response to an idea, which presumably would be protected 
by the First Amendment.93 Justice Stevens leaves open the possibil­
ity that expression of an idea and, more pertinently, bringing public 
attention to that idea (for example, handing out handbills) would 
be protected under the First Amendment because the activity in 
question "depends entirely on the persuasive force of the idea."94 
In sum, Tree Fruits and Safeco illustrate the struggle the Court 
faces when trying to define and protect First Amendment rights 
within the complex sphere of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).95 Moreover, these 
cases reveal a disparity of analysis as a result of the inherent tension 
between § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the First Amendment.96 
D. Picketing or Speech: Understanding the Parameters 
1. The Board's View 
There are distinct inconsistencies in recent Board opinions re­
garding what types of activity constitute picketing.97 No case artic­
92. ld. at 619 (emphasis added) (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers 
Local 802 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., 
concurring)). 
93. In wrestling with the admittedly difficult constitutional question, Justice Ste­
vens stated that 
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves 
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may 
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the 
ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it 
the subject of restrictive regulation." 
ld. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Wohl, 315 U.S. at 776-77 (Douglas, J., con­
curring)); see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1719 (acknowledging 
the distinction Justice Stevens made pursuant to handbills and picketing). 
94. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619. 
95. Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts After DeBartolo: Has the Su­
preme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New Weapon?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 217, 221 
(1989). 
96. Fisk, supra note 84, at 85-86; Kohler, supra note 58, at 178; Modjeska, supra 
note 38, at 1016-22; see also Beard, supra note 95, at 221. 
97. See Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1253 n.5 (2006); Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006) 
(Liebman, Member, concurring in part) (implying that picketing requires a physical or 
symbolic barrier), enforcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
These inconsistencies are further exacerbated by the D.C. Circuit's recent implicit re­
versal of the Board's interpretation of picketing in Sheet Metal I. Sheet Metal Workers' 
Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 V. NLRB (Sheet Metal II), 491 F.3d. 429, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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ulates this tension more succinctly than Sheet Metal Workers Local 
15 (Sheet Metal 1).98 At issue were the definitional components 
that give rise to the consequential moniker of picketing.99 In Sheet 
Metal I, the union was charged with a violation of § 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B) 
because it staged a "mock funeral" in front of a hospital to bring 
attention to a labor dispute with a construction company working 
inside the hospital. lOo In addition to the "funeral procession," the 
union also handed out handbills and displayed the infamous rubber 
rat on public property.101 While the Board was unanimous in con­
cluding that the mock funeral procession was an unlawful secon­
dary activity under § 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B), there was a divergence in the 
legal analysis as to why.102 
Member Liebman found that the procession was unlawful be­
cause the four people were engaged in "ambulatory patrolling," 
thus "effectively creat[ing] a symbolic barrier, a line in front of the 
entrance way not to be crossed."103 Relying on the principles ar­
ticulated in DeBartolo II, and more recently by the Ninth Circuit in 
Overstreet v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 1506, Mem­
ber Liebman opined that there needed to be something "more than 
mere persuasion" in the delivery of the message-"it also involves 
the intimidation of the physical or symbolic barrier to the entrance 
way."104 
98. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d 429. The procedural history of Sheet Metal encom­
passes three distinct decisions of import. The first is from the Eleventh Circuit regard­
ing an injunction, the second from the Board's decision of the unfair labor practice 
charge, and lastly the most recent D.C. Circuit denial to enforce the Board's order. See 
id. at 438-39. 
99. See Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3. While the display of the rat was an 
issue in Sheet Metal I, the Board was able pass on the legality given the plethora of 
union protests. Id. Rather, the Board focused on other proscribed behavior in at­
tempting to define picketing. Id. at 200. 
100. Id. at 199. In pertinent part, the union conducted a mock funeral procession 
(complete with a faux casket and a person dressed as the grim reaper), passed out leaf­
lets, and displayed a large rubber rat on public property. The members actually carried 
the casket and patrolled back and forth on the property. Id. at 199-200. 
101. Id. at 200 n.3. As previously mentioned, the Board chose not to pass judg­
ment on the rat believing that the other conduct violated § 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B) and that 
there was no need to tackle the more difficult question of the rat. Id. 
102. The Board found the activity of the funeral procession to be unlawful picket­
ing of a secondary employer, which would induce a severance with the primary. Thus 
the activity was coercive and a violation of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Id. at 200. 
103. /d. (Liebman, Member, concurring in part) (relying on Overstreet v. United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners ofAmerica, Local Union No. 1506,409 F.3d 1199 
(9th Cir. 2005)). 
104. Id. ("In finding the violation I am guided by the principles set forth in 
[DeBartolo II] and [Overstreet]." (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
2008]29 U.S.c. § J58(b)(4)(ii)(B) AND THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT RULE 885 
The crux of Liebman's reasoning was grounded in the ambula­
tory conduct of the participants and appeared in the last sentence of 
her in-part concurrence, where she stated: 
The gravamen of the violation is not that patrollers carried a faux 
casket and a costumed "grim reaper" figure carrying a sickle, for 
these expressive displays offer "mere persuasion" and do not 
serve to erect a physical or symbolic barrier to the Medical 
Center's entrance. Rather, it is the patrolling itself that erected a 
barrier to entering the hospital.105 
In guarded prose, the majority did not agree with Member 
Liebman's analysis of the situation. In particular, the majority dis­
agreed with the premise that picketing "requires a physical or sym­
bolic barrier."106 In doing so, the majority cast a broad and 
noncommittal net in trying to define picketing, stating, "[i]t may be 
that other conduct, short of a barrier, can be 'conduct' that is pick­
eting or at least 'restraint or coercion' within the meaning of Sec­
tion 8(b)( 4)(ii)(B). "107 
2. The D.C. Circuit's Rebuke 
Subsequent to the Board's decision in Sheet Metal I, the union 
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for review, and 
the Board cross appealed for enforcement of its original order.108 
The court disagreed with the Board's conclusion that the conduct of 
the union was the "functional equivalent of picketing" and denied 
enforcement of the order, which essentially reversed the Board's 
decision.109 The court analogized the conduct of the mock funeral 
to hand billing, finding that the means employed merely produced a 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Overstreet, 
409 F.3d 1199)). 
105. ld. 
106. ld. (majority opinion). 
107. ld.; see also Timothy F. Ryan & Katherine M. Davis, Banners, Rats, and 
Other Inflatable Toys: Do They Constitute Picket Activity? Do They Violate Section 
8(b)(4)?, 20 LAB. LAW. 137, 154 (2004) (positing that the "visceral" message is enough 
to "dissuad[e] ... consumer[s] from dealing with neutral employer. As a result, this 
conduct is clearly most analogous with 'picketing' "). 
108. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB (Sheet Metal II), 491 
F.3d 429, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
109. ld. at 438-40. It is important to note that while the Board is obligated to 
follow the order of the court of appeals in this case, it does not become precedent perti­
nent to Board law. In other words, the Board is not obligated to adopt the D.C. Cir­
cuit's interpretation of picketing in a subsequent case. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, supra note 6, at 2597-98. 
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persuaSIve message not to patronize the hospital and nothing 
more.110 
The D.C. Circuit held the conduct to be "a combination of 
street theater and hand billing" and, thus, completely legal under 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the Supreme Court's holding in DeBartolo 
II.III The court went on to rebuke any notions that the conduct 
rose to the level of "signal picketing" or that it "interfered with or 
confronted patrons entering or leaving the hospital. "112 
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit delineated its holding from Mem­
ber Liebman's concurrence, opining that the presence of ambula­
tory patrol does not automatically create a symbolic barrier that is 
the functional equivalent of picketing. I 13 In this instance there was 
no interference, no interruption, and no overt confrontation with 
patrons. The mock funeral occurred parallel to the front of the hos­
pital, 100 feet from the entrance.114 The court held that to pro­
scribe this conduct as picketing simply because of the ambulatory 
patrol of the protesters was irreconcilable with its interpretation of 
§ 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B), or the Supreme Court's definition of picketing in 
DeBartolo II.ll5 In essence, the court held that the potential effects 
of the activity are more dispositive than the actual conduct itself. In 
other words, an ambulatory patrol 100 feet from the entrance of the 
hospital does not automatically create a symbolic barrier worthy of 
a picket line.116 
Finally, the court dispatched with a contrary ruling by the Elev­
enth Circuit that is-at least on first appearance-in direct opposi­
tion with the Sheet Metal II decision. 117 Prior to the case being 
110. Sheet Metal Jl, 491 F.3d at 438-40. 
111. Id. at 437. 
112. Id. at 438. The court went on to examine whether the conduct was coercive, 
threatening, or intimidating which would also trigger a § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation. Un­
derstanding the consequential First Amendment implications of such a holding, the 
court analogized to recent abortion clinic protests, and found the conduct to be legal 
and secondary to First Amendment principles. Id. at 438-40. This concept will be ex­
plored in subsequent sections. See infra Part I.E.3. 
113. Sheet Metal Jl, 491 F.3d at 438-40. 
114. Id. at 432. 
115. Id. at 438. 
116. !d. The court did not hold that the conduct could never be picketing, but did 
bring attention to the fact that in these particular set of facts, there was no interference 
or confrontation with patrons of the hospital. Therefore, the court could not accept 
Member Liebman's per se rule concerning ambulatory patrol as it related to picketing. 
Id. 
117. The Eleventh Circuit held that it was reasonable to construe that the mock 
funeral was the functional equivalent of picketing. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' 
Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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heard by the Board or the D.C. Circuit, a Florida district court 
granted the Regional Director of the NLRB an injunction, prohibit­
ing the aforementioned conduct because it was the "functional 
equivalent of picketing." The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed that decision.11s The D.C. Circuit criticized the 
Board and the Eleventh Circuit for not distinguishing the "ends 
from the means" and further stated that the conduct "was not the 
functional equivalent of picketing as a means of persuasion because 
it had none of the coercive characteristics of picketing, as the Elev­
enth Circuit itself found."119 In sum, the answer to this question 
appears embedded within the dialectic of these two legal analyses. 
3. Picketing Under the NLRA-Who's Right? 
Before embarking on the daunting task of statutory interpreta­
tion, it is worth reiterating that the definition of picketing appears 
nowhere within the NLRA.12° Merriam Webster's Dictionary de­
fines picket in pertinent part as "to walk or stand in front of ... a 
person posted by a labor organization at a place of work affected by 
a strike, also: a person posted for demonstration or protest."121 
Clearly this definition does little to aid in untangling the legal dis­
position of this important term of art. 
From a historical perspective, the term "picket" is derived 
from military origins. "The function of 'pickets' in the military 
sense was to prevent, by force or alarm, the crossing by the enemy 
of the so-called 'picket line."'122 In contrast however, "[p]olitical 
'picketing' does not usually have this military function of prevent­
ing the crossing of a line; its purpose is more clearly that of publiciz­
ing and dramatizing a point of view and of attracting new adherents 
to it. "123 
118. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 437 (quoting Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265). In fair­
ness to the Eleventh Circuit, the standard in a § 10(1) hearing is that the judge must 
have a reasonable basis to determine that the injunction is warranted (a significantly 
lesser standard than in the present scenario). However, the court's dictum was firmly 
entrenched in the aforementioned statement. [d.; see also 29 U.S.c. § 1510(1) (2000). 
119. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 437-38. The court furthered the argument by 
rejecting the assertion that the conduct was coercive and thus illegal under 
§ 158(b)( 4)(ii) of the Act. [d. at 439. This concept will be explored in detail in subse­
quent sections. See infra Part I.E.1-.3. 
120. RAY ET AL., supra note 35, at 137. 
121. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DlcrIONARY 937 (11th ed. 2003). 
122. OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 359. 
123. [d. 
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In DeBartolo II, the Supreme Court gave insight into what 
types of conduct would classify as picketing in regard to a sec­
ondary employer.124 Realizing that a broad definition of picket 
or coercion related to a secondary employer would put 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) in a perilous position by exposing it to potential 
constitutional violations, the Supreme Court reverted to the legisla­
tive history and prior decisions to escape the looming and conse­
quential First Amendment trap.125 
Returning to its decision in Safeco, the DeBartolo II Court re­
iterated that "picketing is 'a mixture of conduct and communica­
tion' and the conduct element 'often provides the most persuasive 
deterrent.' "126 The Court once again identified picketing as being 
significantly different than other forms of communication, and fur­
ther distinguished disseminating a message (such as handbilling or 
protesting) from picketing because it "depend[ s] entirely on the 
persuasive force of the idea. "127 
In analyzing the statute, the Court interpreted the publicity 
proviso to clarify what Congress meant to regulate in pertinence 
with § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).128 In due course, the Court relied heavily 
on the legislative history of the proviso and the perceived intention 
124. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 577-79 (1988). Other courts have examined 
DeBartolo II. See Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 
Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1213-16 (9th Cir. 2005); Benson v. United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277-80 (D. 
Utah 2004); Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165-68 
(C.D. Cal. 2003); Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346 
N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006) (Liebman, Member, concurring in part), enforcement denied 
and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
125. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578. 
The case turns on whether handbilling such as involved here must be held 
to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" to cease doing business with an­
other.... But more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of 
§ 8(b)( 4)(ii)(B): that section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or re­
straints. Those words, we have said, are "nonspecific, indeed vague," and 
should be interpreted with "caution" and not be given a "broad sweep." 
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960)). 
126. Id. at 580. 
127. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 
447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
128. The Court relied on Senator Kennedy's post-conference committee com­
ments. In describing the compromise agreed upon by Congress, Senator Kennedy 
stated that a "union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in 
newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carryon all publicity 
short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site." DeBartolo II, 485 
U.S. at 586-87 (quoting 105 CONGo REC. S16,414 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 71, at 1432). 
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that Congress sought to allow "all publicity short of ambulatory 
picketing in front of a secondary site."129 
The NLRB, however, has offered various definitions of picket­
ing that appear, at first glance, to be more representative of the 
facts of each situation, rather than a concrete principle of law.130 
For example, the Board has found picketing when a large number 
of people, gathered without picket signs, were marching in front of 
the business handing out handbills. l3l While the Board did not la­
bel the conduct as picketing per se, it nevertheless was found to be 
coercive in that patrons needed to "force" their way through the 
throng to get inside.132 
Recently, however, the Board and the Eleventh Circuit have 
relied on a broad definition of picketing that was formulated by the 
Board in United Mine Workers of America, District 2 (Jeddo Coal 
Co.). This definition stated that "[ n ]either patrolling alone nor pa­
trolling combined with the carrying of placards are essential ele­
ments to a finding of picketing; rather, the essential feature of 
picketing is the posting of individuals at entrances to a place of 
129. Id. at 587. 
130. Compare Chi. Typographical Union No. 16, 151 N.L.R.B. 1666, 1669 (1965) 
("One of the necessary conditions of 'picketing' is a confrontation in some form be­
tween union members and employees, customers, or suppliers who are trying to enter 
the employer's premises." (quoting NLRB v. United Furniture Workers of Am., 337 
F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir. 1964))), and Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet 
Metal 1), 346 N.L.R.B. 199,200 (2006) (Liebman, Member, concurring in part) ("[I]t is 
the patrolling itself that erected a barrier ..."), with United Mine Workers of Am., 
Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 677, 686, (2001) ("[N]either patrolling alone nor 
patrolling combined with the carrying of placards are essential elements to a finding of 
picketing; rather, the essential feature of picketing is the posting of individuals at en­
trances to a place of work."). 
131. Servo Employees Union, Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 
742-43 (1993). 
132. [d. at 743. Groups, varying in size from twenty to seventy persons and com­
prised of members of a labor organization, who were not carrying placards but who 
were distributing handbills, marched in an elliptical path immediately in front of the 
main entrance to an exhibition hall and caused patrons to force their way through in 
order to enter the building. The Board, while abstaining from labeling the conduct, 
concluded that it was coercive conduct within the meaning of § 158(b)(4)(ii). Id. at 742. 
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work."133 This posting, presumably, is the violative "coercing" 
agent which triggers § 158(b)(4)(ii).134 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit rejected this broad defini­
tion in a case involving union members holding a large banner in 
front of a secondary employer.135 The court in Overstreet stated 
that the Board was "not entitled to the usual deference accorded 
the agency, because the statutory question must be answered with 
the awareness of the line between constitutionally-protected speech 
and unprotected activity."136 The Overstreet court concluded that 
the mere presence of the union members did not rise to the level of 
coerciveness.B7 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit gave the distinct im­
pression that ambulatory picketing is necessary to trip the prover­
bial trap in secondary pressure cases in which union speech rights 
are at issue.138 
An added wrinkle to the determination of what constitutes 
picketing is the concept of "signal picketing." A typical example of 
signal picketing occurs when a union stations members or "placards 
near an entrance-positioned so that anyone approaching can read 
the printed message."139 This "signal" is construed as conduct that 
"induce[s] action by those to whom the signal is given."140 
133. Jeddo Coal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. at 686; see Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' 
Int'I Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, absent placards, 
the union's activity of carrying a casket sufficed as picketing). Moreover, the Kentov 
court stated: 
"The important feature of picketing appears to be the posting by a labor or­
ganization ... of individuals at the approach to a place of business to accom­
plish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping 
employees away from work or keeping customers away from the employer's 
business." 
Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797, 
156 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1965». 
134. Jeddo Coal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. at 686. 
135. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 
1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). 
136. Id. Traditionally, the courts give broad deference to the Board's interpreta­
tion of the NLRA. However, in matters in which a constitutional issue arises, the level 
of deference is lessened. Id. 
137. Id. at 1215. 
138. Id. 
139. Servo Employees Union, Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 
743 (1993). 
140. Id.; see also Int'I Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 
Local No. 433 V. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB V. Local 182, Int'l 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that picket signs in snow 
banks constituted a picket line); Teamsters, Local Union No. 688 (Levitz Furniture Co. 
of Mo., Inc.), 205 N.L.R.B. 1131, 1133 (1973). 
2008]29 U.S.c. § J58(b)(4)(ii)(B) AND THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT RULE 891 
However, the parameters of signal picketing are much nar­
rower than those of traditional picketing.141 Signal picketing also 
occurs when union members covertly send messages to other union 
members or affiliates and employees of the secondary employer to 
"engage in an unfair labor practice."142 The Supreme Court has 
stated that free speech protections are not applicable because the 
members are sending a signal to other union members that involves 
"more than mere speech" of which a failure to abide by the signal is 
"implicitly backed up by sanctions. "143 
The Overstreet court declined to expand this definition to in­
clude anyone coming in contact with the signal. To do so, opined 
the court, would be inconsistent with DeBartolo II in that handbil­
ling would be classified under the umbrella of signaling, presumably 
. raising constitutional issues.l44 Moreover, using signals tradition­
ally associated with a labor dispute does not rise to the artful level 
of signal picketing.145 Words such as "scab" and "rat" have "be­
come 'common parlance in labor disputes,''' and thus have no sig­
nificance when directed at the general public at large.l46 This seems 
especially true when suppression of the supposed signal would in­
cite constitutional issues.147 
In sum, to violate § 158(b)( 4 )(ii)(B), there must be more than 
speech and more than the communication of an idea. There must 
be some conduct that rises to the level of coerciveness.148 To what 
141. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215. 
142. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 
690 (1951»; see also Local 274, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumb­
ing & Pipefitting Indus., 267 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1114 (1983). 
143. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215 ("The entire concept of signal picketing thus 
depends on union employees talking to each other, not the public." (emphasis omit­
ted»; see also BRUCE S. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 305-06 (4th ed. 
2000). 
144. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215. This begs the question: Is signal picketing in 
and unto itself is constitutional? That question, however, is left for different scholars, 
for a different day. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 
(1974»; see also Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The rat has 
long been used as a symbol of efforts to protest unfair labor practices ...."). 
147. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun­
cil (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("Another rule of statutory construction, 
however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute 
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 
(citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979))). 
148. Id. at 578. See generally NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Safeco), 447 U.S. 
607 (1980); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree 
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end such conduct satisfies the parameters of the statute will be ex­
plored further in the ensuing section. 
E. 	 Labor's Unique Brand of Speech: DeBartolo II and Its 
Progeny 
1. 	 DeBartolo II & Handbilling 
In DeBartolo II, the Court once again revisited the tension be­
tween a union's First Amendment right to call public attention to a 
labor dispute and neutral party rights in the midst of a labor dis­
pute.149 The union in DeBartolo II had a primary labor dispute 
with a subcontractor working within the shopping mall, which the 
DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo) owned and operated.150 
Rather than picket the mall, the union peacefully distributed 
handbills to customers, asking them not to shop at the mall until its 
owners promised to pay fair wages and benefits to the construction 
workers.l51 DeBartolo filed an unfair labor practice charge against 
the union pursuant to § 158(b)( 4)(ii), alleging that the union's activ­
ity coerced its customers to shut off all trade with the mall, effec­
tively forcing DeBartolo to cease its business with the construction 
company.152 
The Board ultimately found the activity to be coercive under 
§ 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B), choosing not to inquire into the constitutional 
implications of proscribing the union from handbilling.153 The 
Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement, holding that the Board's de­
cision raised constitutional doubts pertinent to the union's First 
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964); Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418 
F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2005); Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Benson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. 
Supp. 2d 1275, 1277 (D. Utah 2004); Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. 
Supp. 2d 1155, 1165-67 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 
(Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006). 
149. 	 See generally DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578. 
150. 	 Id. at 570. 
151. Id. The Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council (the 
union) had a labor dispute with H.J. High Construction (High) (a subcontractor hired 
by H.J. Wilson, the primary contractor). Id. The handbills asked customers not to shop 
at the mall because High paid substandard wages. This practice was a community con­
cern because it decreased economic purchasing power for working people. ld. at 571. 
The handbill specified that it was not "seeking to induce any persons from ceasing work 
or making deliveries." ld. at 570 n.1. 
152. 	 Id. at 571-72. 
153. ld.; see also Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 273 N.L.R.B. 
1431, 1432 (1985), affd, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
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Amendment rights, and it construed the statute not to prohibit con­
sumer publicity.154 
The Supreme Court also rejected the Board's interpretation of 
the statute, holding, as it did in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi­
cago, that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute 
would raise constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress."155 Therefore, in its most basic 
form, '" [t ]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction 
must be resorted to, In order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality.' "156 
The Court concluded that the handbills were lawful from sev­
eral legal angles. First, they truthfully informed the public of a la­
bor dispute.157 Second, there was no "picketing or patrolling."158 
Finally, the speech in question was given a higher value than com­
mercial speech because it "pressed the benefits of unionism to the 
community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy 
and the standard of living of the populace."159 The Court contin­
ued, stating that such "speech itself is protected by the First 
Amendment, however these handbills are to be classified. "160 The 
Court concluded that proscription of handbilling would raise seri­
ous constitutional issues and, therefore, construed the statute so 
that it did not violate the First Amendment.161 
Further, the Court rejected the Board's argument that the 
handbills were equally as coercive as a picket line because they in­
flicted economic harm onto the mall owners.162 The Court ex­
amined the legislative history of the pUblicity proviso of 
154. DeBartolo ll, 485 U.S. at 573-74 (citing Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1328 (11th Cir. 1986), affd, 485 U.S. 568 
(1988». 
155. [d. at 575 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979». 
The obvious constitutional issue in DeBartolo II was that to proscribe citizens' ability to 
pass out handbills (secondary to a violation of § 158(b)(4)(ii» could interfere with their 
First Amendment speech rights. [d. 
156. [d. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895». 
157. [d. 
158. [d. at 575-76. 
159. !d. at 576. 
160. [d. In its summation, the Court appeared to be wrestling with how to clas­
sify the speech stating, "[w]e do not suggest that communications by labor unions are 
never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of consti­
tutional protection. The handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical 
commercial speech such as advertising the price of a product." [d. 
161. [d. at 578. 
162. [d. 
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§ 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B) and found it to be a clarifying tool pertinent to 
what activity would be tolerated under the statute.163 The proviso 
articulates a clear intent from Congress to allow publicity and 
"[h]ad they wanted to bar any and all non-picketing appeals, 
through newspapers, radio, television, handbills, or otherwise, the 
debates and discussions would surely have reflected this inten­
tion."l64 In addition to Senator Kennedy's post-committee state­
ments,165 Congressman Griffin stated that "the bill covered 
boycotts carried out by picketing neutrals but would not interfere 
with the constitutional right of free speech."166 Ignoring the argua­
ble non sequitur of this statement, Congressman Griffin nonethe­
less claimed that activity short of ambulatory picketing will not be 
deemed coercive pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) despite the eco­
nomic consequences of the speech.167 
In short, DeBartolo II interprets the statute to prohibit only 
"ambulatory picketing" in regard to labor disputes with secondary 
businesses, thus allowing the persuasive force of the union's 
handbilling activity even if the activity results in adverse economic 
consequences to a neutral party.168 As such, the Court returned to 
its earlier rationale in Tree Fruits and Safeco,169 interpreting the 
"restrain or coerce" clause of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) to apply only to 
narrow circumstances that would not implicate First Amendment 
concerns.170 
2. Overstreet and San Antonio 
Recently unions have accentuated their hand billing, not only 
with large rubber rats, but also with large handheld banners that 
publicize a labor dispute at a secondary site.171 This activity has 
163. Id. at 582. 
164. Id. at 584. 
165. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (Sen. Kennedy's committee 
comments). 
166. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 584 (citing 105 CONGo REC. H14,339 (daily ed. Aug. 
12, 1959) (statement of Rep. Griffin), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 71, at 1615). 
167. Id. at 584-88. 
168. Id.; see also Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Lo­
cal Union No. 1506,409 F.3d 1199, 1210-12 (9th Cir. 2005). 
169. See supra, notes 59-96 and accompanying text. 
170. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 584-87 
171. See Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1202; San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. 
Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1997); Benson v. United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1276 (D. Utah 
2004); Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159-60 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
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been met with a somewhat mixed analysis by the Board and the 
courtS.172 The General Counsel of the NLRB and various AU de­
cisions have interpreted the banners to be coercive under the Act 
for a variety of reasons.173 
In contrast to recent ALJ decisions, the courts have generally 
upheld hand-held banners as a valid, legal, and constitutionally pro­
tected form of labor speech, even when displayed at a secondary 
siteP4 In Overstreet, for example, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that because the banners were "stationary, non­
interactive and truthful" and, "[i]n light of the First Amendment 
concerns[,] ... Overstreet did not show a fair chance of proving that 
the Carpenters' bannering [was] within the scope of the 'threaten, 
coerce, or restrain' language of § 158(b)(4)(ii)."175 
Following Sa/eco and DeBartoLo II, the Ninth Circuit distin­
guished the stationary handheld banners from illegal picketing, stat­
ing that, "The physical conduct of picketing 'involves patroL of a 
particular locality' and the mere 'presence of a picket line' induces 
certain actions-namely refusing to cross that line."176 For all prac­
tical purposes, the presence of banners lacked any critical conduct 
that would have prohibited them under the statuteP7 Moreover, 
the court analogized the banners to the DeBartoLo handbills as be­
ing "mere persuasion" and not the same type of intimidation a cus­
172. Compare Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1211-12 (holding that banners being held by 
union members were more akin to the" 'mere persuasion'" of handbilling of DeBartolo 
II than '''intimidation of by a line of picketers' in Safeco" (quoting DeBartolo II, 485 
U.S. at 580), with Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'I Ass'n Local 15,418 F.3d 1259, 
1265 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[I]t is well-settled that the existence of placards on sticks is not a 
prerequisite to a finding that a union engaged in picketing."). While not ruling specifi­
cally on the inflatable rat, the Eleventh Circuit, in dicta, referred favorably to the AU's 
decision that found the rat to violate § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Id. at 1266. 
173. See Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1203-04 n.7. Currently, all cases regarding "ban­
nering" and the "rat" must be submitted to the Division of Advice with a detailed 
factual analysis of the case before any charge can be filed. See, e.g., Advice Memoran­
dum, supra note 14; see also Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners, 
and Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Na­
tional Labor Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1621, 1625 n.27 (2007) (stating that there are currently nine bannering cases pend­
ing before the Board). 
174. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1204 n.7, 1218; Benson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1281; 
Kohn, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 
175. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1218-19 (emphasis added). 
176. /d. at 1210 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Saleco), 447 U.S. 
607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring». 
177. [d. at 1211-12. 
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tomer would experience from an ambulatory picket line producing 
a physical or symbolic barrier to the entrance.178 
While choosing to employ the doctrine of constitutional avoid­
ance of Catholic Bishop (thUS not ruling specifically whether the 
banners are pure speech),179 the Overstreet court held that proscrip­
tion of the banners would raise serious constitutional issues. There­
fore, it interpreted the statute to allow them absent any clear 
prohibition.180 In dicta, however, the court analogized the banners 
to other protected forms of speech such as billboards and signage 
and commented that the "pithiness [of the message] does not re­
move the banners from the scope of the First Amendment protec­
tions. "181 The court maintained that the speech was fully protected 
because it intended to convey a message of a social importance.182 
The court rejected the argument that an emotional response to the 
banners removed the speech from the protective umbrella of the 
First Amendment. It found emotive impact of the words "Shame 
on Precision" on the banner in Overstreet to be comparably akin to 
that of the "Fuck the Draft" jacket protected in the seminal free 
speech case Cohen v. California. As a result, the court found the 
banners to be protected speech as wel1.183 
As mentioned previously, the Overstreet court also rejected the 
"signal picketing" argument because the banners were not directed 
specifically at other union members instructing them that a picket 
line was in existence.184 Moreover, nonlabor cases have illustrated 
that the Court is reluctant to censor legitimate speech because of 
the off chance that an improper audience will hear the speech.185 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 1214 n.18. Traditionally, the courts give broad deference to the 
Board's interpretation of the NLRA. However, in matters in which a constitutional 
issue arises, the level of deference decreases. Id. 
180. Id. at 1209-11. 
181. Id.; see also Thcker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the display of an inflatable rubber rat is protected as symbolic speech). 
This case is distinguishable because it concerns a city ordinance, not a secondary boy­
cott. Nonetheless, it articulates an important point of speech protection. The court 
refers to the "rat" as a symbol of "unfair labor practices." Id. 
182. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212-13; see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
104 (1940). 
183. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212. In Cohen, the Court stated that "words are 
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
184. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215-16. 
185. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) (holding that 
drive-in movies that showed naked bodies could not be censored on the grounds that 
minors might see them while driving by because such censorship unnecessarily abridged 
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The bannering cases further illustrate the dichotomy between 
what constitutes picketing and what constitutes coercive behavior 
under § 158(b)( 4)(ii).l86 It is well settled that fraudulent speech 
does not receive First Amendment protection.l87 In San Antonio 
Community Hospital v. Southern California District Council of 
Carpenters, the court held that hand-held banners stating "THIS 
MEDICAL FACILITY IS FULL OF RATS"188 were unlawful be­
cause they misled patrons into believing that the hospital had a ro­
dent problem.l89 
The union argued that the term "rat" has a long history in 
describing labor disputes involving an "employer who fails to pay 
prevailing wages or a worker who works for substandard wages."190 
Therefore, the union argued that the statement was in essence cor­
rect in that the facility was full of rats.191 Predictably, the court 
rejected this argument.192 The context in which the union 
presented the message was misleading, despite the iconic history of 
the rat.l93 Constitutional protection would be easily reestablished 
with some creative and non-misleading wording. For instance, the 
court stated that handbills194 or banners that specifically referred to 
the employer as the rat would not be misconstrued as fact.1 95 
the First Amendment rights of those who were legally able to encounter the speech); 
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
186. See Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1213-15; Benson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & 
Joiners of Am. Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Utah 2004); Kohn v. Sw. 
Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2003). In all these 
cases the General Counsel, Regional Directors, and the AU decisions held that the 
banners constituted coercive behavior and, thus, violated the statute. See Rakosczy, 
supra note 173, at 1624-25 (pointing out the disparate applications of the "picketing 
test"). 
187. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Ryan 
& Davis, supra note 107, at 147-48. 
188. San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 
1230, 1236 (9th Cir. 1997). 
189. Id. at 1236-37. The court held that the hospital had a reasonable chance of 
meeting the "actual malice" standard that was articulated in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan. Id. at 1240 (citing New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80). 
190. San Antonio Cmty. Hasp., 125 F.3d at 1236. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 1236-37. 
193. Id.; see also Thcker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that the "rat" is a symbol "to protest unfair labor practices"). 
194. Signs that stated, "Don't Help Feed The Rat" that connected the employer 
as being the "rat" were permissible. Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, Local 655, 840 F. Supp. 697, 705 (E.D. Mo. 1993), atfd, 39 
F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1994). 
195. San Antonio Cmty. Hasp., 125 F.3d at 1236. 
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3. The Sheet Metal Split (Redux) 
a. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit also explored, albeit cursorily, the tenu­
ous relationship between a union's First Amendment Rights and 
the secondary boycott provision of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).196 Similar to 
the Board's eventual opinion, the Eleventh Circuit used an ex­
panded lens to define picketing, thus proscribing the union's activi­
ties.197 As mentioned previously, the union in Sheet Metal 
conducted a mock funeral procession in front of the Brandon Re­
gional Medical Center (the hospital) because of its dispute with an 
installation contractor and a staffing company working for the hos­
pital.198 The union distributed handbills to people entering and ex­
iting the hospital that read "Going to Brandon Regional Hospital 
Should Not be a Grave Decision."199 The "procession" was a wor­
thy performance complete with a faux casket, grim reaper, and pall­
bearers along a public sidewalk approximately 100 feet from the 
hospital's entrance.200 
Such a performance, however, does not immediately violate 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), which consists of two elements. First, there must 
be "conduct that threatens, coerces, or restrains." Second, "the 
union's conduct [must] force or require an employer or person not 
to handle the products of, or to do business with, another per­
son. "201 Here, the court held that the procession was equivalent to 
picketing and was coercive, thus any First Amendment protection 
was removed.202 In addition to the patrolling element of the con­
duct, the court also stated that because the union played loud and 
somber music from speakers onsite, the activity was a "'mixture of 
conduct and communication' intended to 'provide the most persua­
sive deterrent to third persons about to enter. "'203 
As Professor Bock points out, the court also positively refer­
ences the ALl's decision in its dicta, opining that the "use of an 
inflatable rat at a hospital, in tandem with the misleading nature of 
196. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1264-66 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
197. Id. at 1265-66. 
198. Id. at 126l. 
199. /d. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 1262. 
202. Id. at 1266. 
203. Id. at 1265 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo 1/),485 U.S. 568, 582 (1988)). 
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handbills distributed at that site, constituted picketing. "204 The 
court in Kentov (similar to the Board) was able to sidestep the issue 
of the inflatable rat. However, if it were pressed, the court appears 
likely to enjoin the activity.205 
b. The D.C. Circuit 
After the Eleventh Circuit reviewed and affirmed the prelimi­
nary injunction, the Board ruled that the activity was coercive and 
appealed to the D.C. Circuit for enforcement of its order.206 The 
D.C. Circuit denied the enforcement of the order and roundly dis­
agreed with the Board and the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation 
that the funeral procession was "coercive" and, therefore, illegal 
under the Act.207 
Recognizing the inherent constitutional implications of such a 
decision, the court analogized the mock funeral procession to abor­
tion clinic protests.208 Therefore, any interpretation of the "coer­
cive" clause in § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) must be examined through the 
lens of First Amendment jurisprudence, not an antiquated interpre­
tation used exclusively for labor speech.209 The dispositive question 
for the D.C. Circuit was how the Supreme Court could find consti­
tutional abortion protests, set up 100 feet from clinics with bul­
lhorns and potentially offensive posters, while proscribing the mock 
funeral procession.210 Moreover, just because the funeral proces­
sion appeared distasteful or offensive to patrons did not remove its 
protection under the First Amendment.211 Therefore, the court 
held that the union's "protest was consistent with the limitations 
upheld as constitutional-the buffer zones and the ban on con­
frontational conduct-in Madsen and Hill."212 
204. See Bock, supra note 14, at 924 n.103. 
205. Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1266 n.9; Bock, supra note 14, at 924 n.103. 
206. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, (Sheet Metal 11), 
491 F.3d. 429, 433-34 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
207. Id. at 439. 
208. Id. at 438-39; see also Cannon v. City & County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 
873-74 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding First Amendment speech rights of abortion clinic 
protesters who carried signs which read "The Killing Place"). 
209. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39. 
210. See id. at 439 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,758 
(1994». 
211. Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000». 
212. Id. While the D.C. Circuit did not rule on the rat display, it did remand the 
case back to "the Board to consider the issues it did not reach"-namely the rat display. 
[d. at 440. 
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION 
A. Why Certain Symbols Are Speech 
Imbedded within the genesis of American labor law is a clear 
canon of law that allows labor to exercise its First Amendment 
rights.213 Without freedom to exercise speech rights, the success 
and viability of the nation's labor policy would be in peril.214 How­
ever, the evolution of American labor law has seen this seemingly 
concrete doctrine reduced to a state of amorphousness. It is un­
clear how to determine what types of labor speech are now pro­
tected under the scrutinizing eye of the NLRA and the U.S. 
Constitution.215 
However, outside of the labor arena, the Supreme Court has 
recognized and defined an array of symbols protected as extensions 
of speech that are expressly covered by the First Amendment.216 In 
Spence v. Washington, the Court created a two-element test to de­
termine what types of symbolic behavior come within the purview 
of First Amendment protection.217 In Spence, the Court regarded 
the context in which a symbol is used to be the dispositive factor in 
determining whether the symbol warrants a heightened level of ex­
213. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) ("In the circumstances of 
our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must 
be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the 
Constitution."). 
214. Id. 
215. Compare id. at 105 (holding that peaceful picketing is a constitutionally pro­
tected right), with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (holding that picketing 
does not receive same First Amendment treatment and stating, "[w]e emphatically re­
ject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the 
same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as pa­
trolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford 
to those who communicate ideas by pure speech."), and NAACP v. Claiborne Hard­
ware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (opining that, under the Act, labor picketing is dis­
tinctively different than economic or protest picketing outside the Act). 
216. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557,568 (1995) (holding that the motive of a parade was expression); R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (holding that there are times when burning a cross 
is a constitutionally protected form of speech absent spoken or written words); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989) (holding that flag burning is a constitutionally 
protected form of speech absent spoken or written words); Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (holding that attaching a peace sign to a flag was a valid form of 
speech to protest the United States war policy in Southeast Asia); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,505-06 (1969) (holding that the wearing of black 
armbands to protest Vietnam hostilities was a valid extension and expression of 
speech). 
217. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
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pression.21S In its analysis of whether a student's attaching a peace 
symbol onto an American flag was speech, the Court looked at two 
elements: First, it asked whether there "was an intent to convey a 
particularized message."219 Second, it considered whether, "in the 
surrounding circumstances[,] the likelihood was great that the mes­
sage would be understood by those who viewed it."220 The Court 
interpreted the peace symbol pasted on the flag not as "an act of 
mindless nihilism," but rather as "a pointed expression of anguish 
by the appellant about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs 
of his government. "221 
Once the symbolism is deemed to be an extension of speech, 
courts will assess its constitutionality via an analysis articulated by 
United States v. O'Brien.222 Under O'Brien, the government must 
first prove that the regulation "furthers an important or substantial 
government interest."223 Second, "the government interest [must 
be] unrelated to the suppression of free expression. "224 Lastly, "the 
incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms 
[must be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest. "225 
Imbedded within the O'Brien test is a distinguishing mecha­
nism that determines whether a law is content based or content 
neutral.226 When this mechanism is triggered, it initiates a "switch­
ing function" from O'Brien's less stringent intermediate scrutiny to 
a considerably more stringent strict scrutiny review.227 To be re­
218. [d. at 410. 
219. [d. at 410-11. The particularized element of the quotient seems to have been 
eliminated by the Court. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 ("[A] narrow, succinctly articul­
able message is not a condition of constitutional protection ...."). 
220. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411. 
221. [d. at 410. 
222. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968). A critical factor in the 
application of the O'Brien test is the determination of whether the reason for regula­
tion is based on the content of the message or is content neutral. [d. As will be seen, 
however, subsequent applications of O'Brien flesh out whether or not the motivation to 
regulate or ban the symbolic behavior is content based. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397,403-06 (1989) (discussing the standard pertaining to whether the regulation is re­
lated to the expression). 
223. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
224. [d. (emphasis added). 
225. [d.; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989) (holding 
that while a content-neutral law must be closely tailored to meet its desired ends, the 
government need not employ the least restrictive alternative). 
226. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
227. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
519-20 (2d ed. 2002). Under strict scrutiny review "a law will be upheld if it is necessary 
to achieve a compelling government purpose." [d. (emphasis added). To achieve this 
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garded as content neutral (thus receiving the less stringent O'Brien 
analysis) the governmental interest or purpose of the regulation 
must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression."228 In 
situations in which the purpose, motive, or interest of the govern­
ment is related to the suppression of the symbolic speech, strict 
scrutiny analysis is applied and the speech falls into a more strin­
gently protected category.229 
This was specifically the issue in Texas v. Johnson, in which the 
defendant was convicted of burning an American flag as a symbol 
of protest against the government.230 The Court found that the 
Texas statute prohibiting the desecration of the flag (while content 
neutral on its face) was applied solely in regard to the expressive 
content of Johnson's message of dissatisfaction with the govern­
ment.231 As a result, the Court applied strict review to the statute 
and found that the discriminatory application was specific to the 
content of Johnson's message and, thus, unconstitutional.232 Justice 
Brennan stated that, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable."233 This concept remains constant re­
gardless of "the particular mode in which one chooses to express an 
idea."234 
Not only is the government conduct subject to a stricter review 
when attempting to prohibit symbolic speech secondary to its offen­
sive nature, but it is also subject to such review when attempting to 
end the government must prove that the application of the law is the least restrictive 
and the least discriminatory means available; if not, the government has not satisfied its 
very high burden, thus the law will be invalidated as unconstitutional. Id. 
228. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
229. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989); see also James M. McGold­
rick, Jr., United States v. O'Brien Revisited: Of Burning Things, Waving Things, and G­
Strings, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 903, 929-30 (2006). 
230. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397. 
231. [d. at 411-12 (stating that the Texas statute would have allowed Johnson to 
have burned the flag as a means of disposal, but not as a means of political protest). 
232. [d. at 420. 
233. [d. at 414 (citing, among others, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46, 55-56 (1988); City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 
U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Young v. 
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976) (per curiam); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
95 (1972); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931». 
234. [d. at 416. 
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restrict speech because of the communicative impact on the lis­
tener.235 In Boos v. Barry, Justice O'Connor stated that 
"[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary ef­
fects' we referred to in Renton . . " [This] hypothetical regulation 
targets the direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a 
secondary feature that happens to be associated with that type of 
speech. "236 
The Court has long held that symbolic expression is shielded 
under the protective blanket of the First Amendment. It is worth 
reiterating some of the symbols the Court has protected secondary 
to content-based restrictions: burning crosses, parades, commercial 
picketing protesting civil rights violations, abortion clinic picketing, 
black arm bands, jackets labeled "Fuck the Draft," and of course 
burning a flag.237 While symbolic speech receives a less exacting 
analysis, the O'Brien test provides for a more scrutinizing review 
should it be found that the application and purpose of the restric­
tion were motivated secondary to the content of the expression.238 
Moreover, should it be discovered that the speech is suppressed 
235. Restrictions based on the emotive or communicative impact on the listener 
are typically interpreted as content-based prohibitions and, thus, subject to strict scru­
tiny review. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (holding 
that a content ban on symbols that invoked racial animosity was unconstitutional); For­
syth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1992) (disallowing permits 
to be regulated because of audience reaction); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 
318 (1990); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the "Fuck the 
Draft" jacket was speech designed purely for emotive impact); see also CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 227, at 1029 (stating that free speech analysis "often turns on whether the 
government's purpose is to suppress a particular message"). 
236. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,321 (1988) (discussing Renton v. Playtime Thea­
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), and striking down a viewpoint-restrictive law which stated, 
"It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted 
to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government"). 
237. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 568 (1995); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) 
(upholding abortion clinic protests as constitutional); R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395-96 (hold­
ing that there are times when burning a cross is a constitutionally protected form of 
speech absent spoken or written words); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that flag 
burning is a constitutionally protected form of speech absent spoken or written words); 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (holding a picket and 
boycott of a diner secondary to perceived civil rights violations was constitutionally 
protected); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (holding that attaching a 
peace sign to a flag was a valid form of speech to protest the U.S. war policy in South­
east Asia); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 504-06 (1969) (holding that the wearing of black arm bands to protest Viet­
nam hostilities was a valid extension and expression of speech). 
238. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403. 
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specifically because of its emotive and communicative effects on the 
listener, the test is also strict scrutiny.239 
B. Rats Can Speak-At Least Under the First Amendment 
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that 
an inflatable rubber rat is a protected medium of symbolic speech 
under the First Amendment.24o In Tucker, the union utilized the rat 
balloon to bring attention to the unfair labor practices of a car deal­
ership in Ohio.241 A content-neutral city ordinance prohibited the 
use of the rat and the police ordered the union to desist from fur­
ther displays.242 The Sixth Circuit stated that the government may 
employ "content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations only if 
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter­
est. "243 In essence, such a regulatory doctrine is equivalent to the 
O'Brien test and the courts have used the two interchangeably pur­
suant to symbolic expression.244 
The court stated, with regard to the status of the display as 
speech, "In our view, there is no question that the use of a rat bal­
loon to publicize a labor protest is constitutionally protected ex­
pression within the parameters of the First Amendment, especially 
given the symbol's close nexus to the Union's message."245 The 
court agreed with the lower court's ruling that the ordinance was 
not narrowly tailored to meet the interests of the state.246 
In sum, it is clear that symbols, absent words or oral speech, 
receive First Amendment protection. The stringency of that protec­
tion depends on the motive or purpose of the regulation. To label 
such communication as conduct (for example, a rat balloon), would 
fall outside the jurisprudence of established constitutional law and 
abridge a right secured by the Constitution. 
239. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 394; Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 134-35; John­
son, 491 U.S. at 412; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. 
240. Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 2005). 
241. /d. The labor dispute in Tucker was an "area standards" dispute on a pri­
mary employer. The union used the inflatable rat in conjunction with legal picketing to 
bring attention to the cause. Id. 
242. /d. at 460-61. 
243. /d. at 463 (quoting Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2001». 
244. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 (articulating the limited distinction be­
tween the O'Brien standard and the time, place, and manner standard). 
245. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 462; see also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 
v. Viii. of Orlando Park, 139 F. Supp. 2d 950, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding an inflatable 
rat to be protected symbolic expression). 
246. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 463-64. 
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III. THE DISPLAY OF THE RAT BALLOON PASSES 

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY MUSTER 

A. 	 The Display of the Rat Is a Form of Politically Relevant 
Symbolic Speech that Should Receive Strict 
Constitutional Review 
Because conduct and speech receive disparate constitutional 
protection, the protection of the display of the rat depends on its 
categorization. Applying the Spence test to the display, it is clear 
that the rat display falls into protected symbolic speech. First, the 
union must prove that it is intending to communicate a message.247 
It would be extremely difficult to argue that the inflation of a 
twenty-foot rat is not trying to convey a message. Further, union 
organizers have stated that the rat is intended to alert the public of 
a labor dispute.248 Finally, as the Tucker court held, the rat is a 
"symbol of efforts to protest unfair labor practices. "249 
The second prong of Spence asks whether, "in the surrounding 
circumstances[,] the likelihood [is] great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it."250 Given the universal mes­
sage of the rat, it seems apparent that people entering a business 
would understand the union's intended message of discontent.251 
While the general public might not understand the intricacies of the 
expression, the appearance of a large inflatable rat with union 
members standing next to it surely articulates a dispute that, in 
turn, is subjected to First Amendment protection as symbolic ex­
pression.252 This holds true so long as the union clearly articulates 
247. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557,567-70 (1995); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409-11 (1974). 
248. See Feuer, supra note 4, at Bl; see also Marquez, supra note 4 ("[T]he rat 
gets people to stop and ask questions about what's going on. . . . That's why we use 
it. "). 
249. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 460; see also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, 
139 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (holding that an inflatable rat is protected symbolic expression). 
250. 	 Spence, 418 U.S. at 411. 
251. This is especially true given that, in both cases involving the rat display, the 
union members also conjunctively handbilled. Handbilling provides a more detailed 
explanation to the public concerning the specifics of an obvious labor dispute. Sheet 
Metal Workers In!'1 Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal/), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006), en­
forcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Laborers' E. Region 
Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1252 (2006). 
252. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 462 ("In our view, there is no question that the use of the 
rat balloon to publicize a labor protest is constitutionally protected expression within 
the parameters of the First Amendment ...."); see also Int'l Union ofOperating Eng'rs, 
Local ISO, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 958 ("We easily conclude that a large inflatable rat is 
protected, symbolic speech."). 
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that the dispute is with the primary employer, which is being em­
ployed by the secondary employer. 
Once the Spence criteria are satisfied, the O'Brien test must be 
applied.2s3 As mentioned previously,254 the government must first 
demonstrate a substantial interest in regulating the behavior.255 As 
the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments show, 
the purpose of § 158(4)(b)(ii)(B) is to prevent secondary employers 
from being economically affected by disputes they did not directly 
initiate.256 Again, putting aside the obvious non sequitur that a sec­
ondary employer is not responsible for the companies it hires, the 
government would be able to assert a substantial government inter­
est. Second, "the governmental interest [must be] unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression."257 If, however, the regulation is 
found to be related to suppression, then strict scrutiny review is 
applied.258 
Should the government try to prohibit the rat display, it would 
be difficult to prove that the suppression of the speech is not con­
tent related. First, it is the rat's message that makes it offensive to 
the secondary employer. It is quite obvious that unions use the rat 
to communicate to the public at large that the secondary employer 
is engaged in hiring practices with which the union disagrees. Busi­
nesses often employ the use of props, banners, blimps, and balloons 
to attract customers to patronize a particular establishment. Unless 
all these promotional props are proscribed, there can be no reason 
for disparately treating the rat display other than because of the 
message it conveys. 
Second, the government could try to assert a non-content rea­
son for suppression. For example, the government could assert that 
the display presents a safety hazard to motorists because it distracts 
253. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). A critical factor in the 
application of the O'Brien test is the determination of whether the regulatory mecha­
nism is based on the content of the message or is content neutral. Id. As will be seen, 
however, subsequent applications of O'Brien flesh out whether or not the motivation to 
regulate or ban the symbolic behavior is content based. 
254. See supra Part II.A. 
255. Id. at 377. 
256. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1007-08 ("The section embodies 'the dual con­
gressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to 
bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending 
employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.'" (quoting NLRB 
v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 692 
(1951))). 
257. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). 
258. See id. at 376-77. 
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their attention from traffic. Once again, however, to assume that 
only an inflatable rat poses such a risk flies in the face of conven­
tional wisdom and would most certainly be struck down as censor­
ship.259 Third, while § 158(b)( 4)(ii)(B) appears content neutral in 
its restriction of behavior that "threaten[ s], coerce[ s], or re­
strain[s]," its discriminatory application would trigger the court to 
employ strict scrutiny.260 
Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, one is strained to find a rea­
son-other than the emotive content of the message-for prohibit­
ing the use of the rat display.261 This being the case, it is 
appropriate to reiterate the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V. v. 
City of St. Paul, in which the Court held that a content ban on sym­
bols that invoked racial animosity was unconstitutional.262 Surely, 
if the Court is going to protect the First Amendment rights of a 
burning cross, a rat balloon should enjoy the same protection. 
This type of analytical syllogism regarding the rat display is 
also analogous to Texas v. Johnson and the act of flag burning as 
speech.263 Similarly to Johnson, suppression of the symbolic speech 
in the present situation would be done under the guise of the con­
tent-neutral statute (i.e., the NLRA). In Johnson, the Court found 
that the government's interest in prohibiting flag burning was not 
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the First Amendment rights of 
the speaker.264 The Court held "that the government may not pro­
hibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message"265 
259. The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Erznoznik v. City ofJack­
sonville. In Erznoznik, the suppressed speech was the content of sexually explicit mov­
ies airing at a drive-in theater. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206 
(1975). The Court discounted the government's public safety argument that a giant 
movie screen portraying naked bodies would cause car accidents. [d. at 215. Finding 
the regulation to be censorship, the Court held that "when the government, acting as a 
censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the 
ground that that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly 
limits its power." [d. at 209. 
260. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 412 (1989); see also United States v. 
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990). 
261. Even if opponents of the display asserted that the rat balloon produced un­
warranted economic hardship upon the secondary employer, the impetus for such hard­
ship (assuming such a hardship actually exists) was created strictly because of the 
content of the message. As a result, courts must still apply strict scrutiny review. 
262. R.A.Y. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992). 
263. See generally Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416 (holding that the burning of the flag 
was an emotive form of political speech). The same could certainly be said of a giant 
rat. 
264. [d. at 418. 
265. [d. at 417. 
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and, furthermore, that such ability or inability to prohibit "is not 
dependent on the particular mode in which one chooses to express 
an idea."266 Holding that burning a flag is a form of political pro­
test, the Court stated further that "[t]o conclude that the govern­
ment may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate 
only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no 
discernable or defensible boundaries."267 
The rat display is analogous to burning a flag. First, it is the 
disagreeable and offensive message that the previous General 
Counsel of the NLRB found to violate the Act.268 Second, absent 
complete economic ruin on the part of the secondary employer, the 
Government will be hard pressed to articulate some other compel­
ling interest. If the Supreme Court cannot find a compelling gov­
ernment interest in protecting our national symbol or in the 
prohibition of a burning cross, one would suspect, based on prece­
dent, that it would not find one to suppress a rat balloon.269 
In sum, it is the unequivocal contention of this Note that the 
display of the rat is a protected form of symbolic political speech, 
subject to regulation only if the government can show a compelling 
state interest and no other less restrictive means of regulation.270 
Much like the burning of a flag is political speech, so too is the 
articulation of a labor dispute.271 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Compare Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Coun­
sel Div. of Advice, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., to Dorothy L. Moore-Duncan, Reg'l Dir. 
Region 4, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. (May 3, 2006), http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedjiles/ 
Advice%20Memos/2006/4-CC-2447%2805-03-06%29.pdf (advising the allowance of the 
presence of the rat because "[pJersons entering the jobsite did not pass the display"), 
with Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel Div. of Ad­
vice, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., to Robert H. Miller, Reg'l Dir. Region 20, Nat'l Labor 
Relations Bd. (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/ 
2004/20-CC-3423%2812-30-04%29.pdf (advising filing a § 158(b)(4)(ii) complaint be­
cause the rat was seen by entering visitors, thus constituting "confrontational conduct"). 
While the distinction might appear slight, it articulates an implicit legal philosophy (on 
behalf of the General Counsel and the Board) concerning the display; it is not the rat 
that violates the Act, but the communicative and emotive impact of it. 
269. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418-19. 
270. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of O'Brien nor a 
comprehensive application of strict scrutiny to the display for that matter. Rather, it is 
intended to place the display of the rat in its rightful protective constitutional cate­
gory-speech-rather than conduct. 
271. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council (Debartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) ("The handbills involved here, how­
ever, do not appear to be typical commercial speech . .. for they pressed the benefits of 
unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and 
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Therefore, before passing judgment on the display, the Board 
and the courts should understand the constitutional issues that arise 
secondary to suppressing the speech. As Professor Kohler in­
sightfully points out, state economic regulation is not applicable 
when the goal of a boycott is "'to bring about political, social and 
economic change' for themselves."272 Consequently, given the po­
litical nature of the speech, the display of the rat balloon should 
receive the highest form of constitutional protection. Thus, prohibi­
tion of its use should be subjected to strict-scrutiny analysis.273 
B. 	 Pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(i), the Display of the Rat Does Not 
Induce Employees of the Secondary Employer to Stop 
Working by Sending a Covert Signal of a Picket Line 
The display of the rat to articulate a labor dispute is not a sig­
nal to other union members to either cease working, or not to cross 
an imaginary picket line.274 Rather, the display is used solely as a 
means of bringing attention to a labor dispute. One union orga­
nizer stated, "[T]he rat gets people to stop and ask questions about 
what's going on ... that's why we use it."275 Additionally, the dis­
play alerts the secondary employer to the labor dispute and allows 
it to choose whether or not to continue its business with the primary 
employer, which mayor may not produce adverse economic conse­
the standard of living of the populace." (emphasis added)); see also NAACP v. Clai­
borne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) ("While States have broad power to 
regulate economic activity we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful politi­
cal activity .... This Court has recognized that expression on public issues 'has always 
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.''' (quoting Ca­
rey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))). This point is only exacerbated by the fact that 
working Americans continue to lose economic ground while corporate CEOs enjoy re­
cord salary increases. In 2007, the average CEO made 364 times more than the average 
worker. See SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2007: THE STAGGERING 
SOCIAL COST OF U.S. BUSINESS LEADERSHIP 5 (2007), available at http://www.fair 
economy.orglfileslExecutiveExcess2007.pdf; see also Greenhouse & Leonhardt, supra 
note 16. 
272. Kohler, supra note 58, at 169 (quoting Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 
911). 
273. This Note recognizes that there are other potential constitutional arguments 
that can be made that are pertinent to the display; namely that, on most occasions, the 
rat is placed on a public sidewalk which could couple the present argument with the 
sidewalk having a special position in terms of First Amendment protection. Hague v. 
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
274. The inflatable rat is analogous to the hand-held banners in Overstreet, which 
were held not to be signals to other union member that a picket line was present. Over­
street v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 
1199, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2005). 
275. 	 Marquez, supra note 4. 
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quences. As a result, any economic impact that results from the 
presence of the rat is due to choices made by the secondary 
employer. 
While it is conceivable that the iconography of the rat could 
arguably be a "signal" to employees of the neutral employer; this 
cannot be the dispositive factor of the analysis given the duality of 
the rat's symbolism.276 This is especially true given that the Sixth 
Circuit recently held that the display of a rat is a universally ac­
cepted symbol of a labor dispute.277 Moreover, the Overstreet court 
articulated that "[t]o broaden the definition of 'signal picketing' to 
include 'signals' to any passerby would turn [this] specialized con­
cept ... into a category synonymous with any . .. labor dispute. . .. 
[If the definition was broadened] the hand billing in DeBartolo II 
would have been deemed signal picketing."278 In other words, the 
doctrine of "signal" picketing rests on a very narrow constitutional 
hinge. It is applicable only in situations in which it is absolutely 
clear that the union is purposefully sending a covert message to 
other union members to cease doing business with the secondary 
employer.279 The fact that a union member could see, and maybe 
react to the display is not dispositive in warranting suppression.280 
Such is clearly the case in this instance. The rat display is not 
sending a covert message to union members. First, the rat is not 
being used in conjunction with a strike; it is being used to dissemi­
nate information of a labor dispute to the general public, not other 
union members working with the secondary employer.281 Much 
like the banners in Overstreet, the rat is traditionally placed on pub­
lic property to heighten exposure to the general public and make its 
message all that more effective.282 
Second, proscribed "signal picketing" is traditionally found in 
situations in which the unions had a specific reason to communicate 
276. While a rat is a symbol of a nonunion worker which takes the place of a 
union worker during a strike, it is also a "contemptible person." See MERRIAM-WEB· 
STER, supra note 121, at 1031; see also supra note 177 and accompanying text (explain­
ing that constitutional principles forbid censoring speech based on who might hear it). 
277. Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The rat has 
long been used as a symbol of efforts to protest unfair labor practices."). 
278. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 1215-16. 
281. The entire concept of signal picketing thus depends on union employees 
talking to each other, which is backed up by potential sanctions. See NLRB v. Denver 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675 (1951). 
282. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1216. 
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to other union members that a strike line was present.283 In this 
situation there is no strike. The display is aimed at educating the 
populace that there is a labor dispute present. Moreover, the dis­
play brings attention to the secondary employer's complicit rela­
tionship with that dispute. 
To ban a speaker's right to inform the public of a labor dispute, 
which is inherently political in nature, because other union mem­
bers might interpret the speech as a "signal," would most certainly 
violate the holding in DeBartolo II.284 This is because the disposi­
tive factor in the analysis is not that the display is some covert, 
iconic message or secret wink-like nod that only other union mem­
bers would understand. Rather, the rat is a universally accepted 
message of a labor dispute and is symbolic of an individual with an 
unscrupulous character. Either way, it is an appeal to the general 
public not to patronize the neutral employer because of its com­
plicit relationship with the primary business. As DeBartolo recog­
nized, this type of speech suppression has potential to raise serious 
constitutional issues.285 Moreover, in both recent rat balloon cases 
there was no evidence produced by the General Counsel that indi­
cated that, had union members continued to do business with the 
secondary employer (in spite of the "secret" message), there would 
have been sanctions pursued by union authorities.286 
C. 	 The Display Is Not "Traditional" Picketing, Thus Not 
"Coercion" Under § J58(b)(4) (ii)(B) 
Establishing that the display is not signal picketing is but one 
corollary in the complicated matrix of analyzing § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), 
and does not end the picketing inquiry. DeBartolo II established 
that "handbilling is only persuasive, whereas picketing is coer­
283. Id. at 1215 n.9 (referring to the Ninth Circuit's previous ruling in Interna­
tional Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local No. 433 v. NLRB, 
598 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979»; see also Gould & Preisner, 341 U.S. 675 (articulat­
ing the concept of signal picketing in the context of a strike). 
284. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215 (holding that banners were not signals to union 
members, but a signal to the public, similar to the signal the union sent to the public in 
DeBartolo 1/). 
285. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun­
cil (DeBartolo 1/), 485 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1988). 
286. See generally Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1264-65 
(2006); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 
205-07 (2006), enforcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In 
both cases the General Counsel and the AU decisions proffered the legal theory and 
circumstantial evidence of signal picketing, but never any direct evidence. 
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cive."287 Therefore, if the display is interpreted to represent a 
picket line then the behavior would be deemed per se "coercive" 
pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(ii), in that customers would be coerced not 
to patronize the secondary.288 
As previously mentioned, the Board and the Eleventh Circuit 
have broadly defined picketing,289 while Member Liebman and the 
Ninth Circuit have followed the paradigm articulated in DeBartolo 
II.z90 The distinguishing feature in the first interpretation is that it 
only requires the mere presence of union members at an entrance 
of a secondary business to label the activity picketing and, thus, 
trigger the coercion trap door of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).291 
Such an arbitrary and amorphous definition is contrary to the 
holding in DeBartolo II and subjects § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) to constitu­
tional questions arising under the First Amendment,292 In other 
words, to proscribe the rat secondary to its mere presence and the 
emotive impact of its message would fly in the face of First Amend­
ment jurisprudence.293 As the Court stated in Cohen v. California, 
"'words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cogni­
tive force'" and that emotive appeal in no way reduces the 
speaker's First Amendment rights.294 Having established the dis­
playas protected speech only further solidifies this point. 
287. See Fisk, supra note 84, at 87. 
288. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB (Sheet Metal II), 491 
F.3d 429, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
289. Id. at 437-38. 
290. See supra Part I.D. 
291. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'! Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 
(11th Cir. 2005) ("[The] important feature of picketing appears to be posting by a labor 
organization ... of individuals at the approach to a place of business to accomplish a 
purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping employees away from 
work or keeping customers away from the employer's business." (quoting Lumber & 
Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797 (Stoltze Land & Lumber Co.), 156 N.L.R.B. 
388, 394 (1965))). 
292. See Fisk, supra note 84, at 87-89; Kohler, supra note 58, at 177-78. It is worth 
noting that both Professors Fisk and Kohler opine that DeBartolo II didn't go far 
enough in the protection of First Amendment rights within the labor context, and both 
also attempt to illustrate the lessened First Amendment protection of labor speech by 
the Court. See Fisk, supra note 84, at 87-89; Kohler, supra note 58, at 177-78. 
293. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 
1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2005); see Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39. 
294. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 
(1971)); see also Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39. 
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1. A Rat Is Not a Picket Line 
The display of the inflatable rat is most analogous to recent 
bannering cases. The purpose of the banners, much like the rat dis­
play, was to raise public attention of a labor dispute.295 In Over­
street, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the holding of DeBartolo II by 
emphasizing that the "only activity that appears clearly proscribed 
by the statute is 'ambulatory picketing' of secondary businesses."296 
Moreover, Overstreet, like DeBartolo II, relied heavily on Senator 
Kennedy's post-conference committee explanation of the statutory 
language, which allows unions to carry out "all publicity short of 
having ambulatory picketing in front ofa secondary site."297 In light 
of the legislative history of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), the court held that 
the activity "'falls short of revealing a clear intent' that bannering 
... is always prohibited."298 
Much like a hand-held banner, the display of the rat balloon is 
stationary. With the exception of union members handing out in­
formational handbills in front of the display, there is neither patrol 
nor any confrontation with customers entering the business, other 
than that initiated by customers accepting the handbills. Oppo­
nents to the display will inevitably assert that the posting of the 
display and union members is unto itself picketing and, thus, coer­
cive under the Act.299 Assuming arguendo that the mere presence 
of union members and a rat balloon could rise to the level of a 
picket line, this assertion intentionally and fatally analyzes the issue 
in "a vacuum," and it ignores the serious First Amendment implica­
295. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1201-02; Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 
289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see Benson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & 
Joiners of Am. Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Utah 2004); Mackson­
Landsberg, supra note 14, at 1154. 
296. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212 (quoting DeBartolo 1I, 485 U.S. at 587). 
297. [d. (quoting 105 CONGo REc. 17,898-99 (1959)); see also supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
298. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1213 (stating that, in the event an activity raises con­
stitutional issues, there should be a "clear intent" by Congress to ban such activity 
(quoting DeBartolo 1I, 485 U.S. at 588)). 
299. See United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 677 
(2001) (holding that stationary union members holding picket signs constituted a picket 
line in the absence of patrolling or blocking entrance); Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am. 
(Calcon Constr. Co.), 287 N.L.R.B. 570, 573 (1987) (holding that picket signs and plac­
ards are not needed for picketing to be present). The cases in which the Board has 
creatively found picketing secondary to "presence" have involved situations where 
"traditional" picketing was used in conjunction with the presence. There was no at­
tempt to disseminate information to the public and no First Amendment analysis. 
Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214 n.18. But see Sheet MetallI, 491 F.3d at 436-37 (holding 
that a mock funeral procession was not a picket line). 
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tions.30o This type of analysis would be a complete abandonment of 
the legislative history of the Act and would put it at odds with the 
Supreme Court's tight-wire constitutional analysis in DeBartolo 
II.301 
2. Come On, Who's Afraid of a Balloon Anyway? 
Dispelling the attenuated picketing argument does not end the 
inquiry into the legality of a rat balloon.302 Should the display be 
interpreted to be a "coercive" boycott call to customers-though 
not a picket line-it would still be illegal under 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).303 Opponents will claim that the mere presence 
of a twenty-foot inflatable rat in front of a business is a coercive 
activity that would create a significant economic hardship on the 
secondary employer, which would force it to cease doing business 
with the primary employer.304 
This argument is most aptly and ironically stated in NAACP v. 
Claiborne when the Court incongruously opined that "[s]econdary 
boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part 
of 'Congress' striking a delicate balance between union freedom of 
expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees and cus­
tomers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial 
stri!e."'305 Opponents will certainly make the case, that while the 
display of the rat is speech, its protection is limited, secondary to 
the words of Congress and the Court's delineation between protest 
and labor speech.306 
300. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 436-37; Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214. 
301. When an activity raises serious constitutional issues, the Court will assume 
that the activity is legal unless there is a clear intent from Congress to proscribe such 
activity. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 575. 
302. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39. Once the D.C. Circuit dispelled the asser­
tion that the mock funeral was picketing, it still needed to analyze whether the speech 
was so coercive as to trigger a § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation. Id. 
303. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000). 
304. The Regional Director of the NLRB applied this type of coerciveness argu­
ment to the hand-held banners in Overstreet. The argument was disposed with because 
of the obvious First Amendment implications. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214. 
305. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,912 (1982) (emphasis ad­
ded) (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)). The irony is that Claiborne held that picket­
ing to protest Civil Rights violations was clearly a right guaranteed by the First Amend­
ment even if it produced a tortious interference with business. Eugene Volokh, Speech 
as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering 
Utterances" and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1290 (2005). 
306. A similar argument was raised by the NLRB in the Sheet Metal II. The 
Board creatively asserted that Claiborne, while upholding secondary picketing, and 
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This argument misses the mark on two main points: First, 
when defining "coercion" in contexts such as these, it "must be un­
derstood in a manner consistent with the First Amendment. "307 As 
stated previously,308 the D.C. Circuit recently held that a mock fu­
neral in front of a hospital (the secondary employer) to articulate a 
labor dispute did not rise to the level of being so coercive as to 
proscribe the speech.309 The court analogized the union's labor 
protest to the abortion protest cases in which the Supreme Court 
held that proscribing the protests (despite the use of offensive lan­
guage and bullhorns) would jeopardize the protester's First 
Amendment rights.310 Given recent rebukes by two different cir­
cuits to the Board's legal reasoning concerning bannering and street 
theater, one would be hard pressed to assert that the presence of a 
rat balloon would rise to the level of coerciveness-at least under 
the analyses of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.311 In short, the D.C. 
Circuit correctly holds that, in order to suppress labor speech as 
being coercive, coerciveness must be defined within the parameters 
of First Amendment jurisprudence.312 
The second problem with analogizing to Claiborne-as the 
Board did in Sheet Metal I-is that the Court never answers the 
question of how to define coercion and goes on to state: 
While States have broad power to regulate economic activity, we 
do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activ­
ity such as that found in the boycott in this case. This Court has 
recognized that expression on public issues "has always rested on 
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values. "313 
In the scenario being examined in this Note, a union is waging 
an informational campaign that appeals to customers to boycott the 
secondary employer based on the persuasiveness of its message 
boycotts in the civil rights arena, prohibited the practice in the labor context. See Sheet 
Metal II, 491 F.3d at 436-37. 
307. [d. at 439. 
308. See supra Part I.D.2. 
309. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 
(2000)); see Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994). 
310. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 716); see Madsen, 
512 U.S. at 758. 
311. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439; Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters 
& Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005). 
312. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439. 
313. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (emphasis ad­
ded) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). 
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(that a labor dispute is present).314 The message being dissemi­
nated is quite political in nature. It raises serious social issues and 
allows for a purely democratic response. There are no physical bar­
riers, no blocked doorways-just the force of an idea. While the 
economic effects of the speech may be substantial, it is the result of 
the persuasiveness of an idea, not some coercive barrier erected by 
the union.315 The symbol of the rat supplements and accentuates 
the idea, giving it life, and producing the visceral response all great 
writers and orators hope to evoke from audiences to their work. 
The reaction to the speech is, therefore, a conscious choice for the 
hearer. If the customers do not want to accept the message as they 
patronize the secondary business, they can just look away.316 
Within this apparent tension lies the rub. As Professor Kohler 
pointed out, this is why the constitutional avoidance doctrine articu­
lated in Catholic Bishop was used in DeBartolo II.317 Rather than 
affirmatively settle the issue and admit the incongruence between 
the less protected labor speech versus other political speech (thUS 
effectively challenging the legitimacy of the Act), the DeBartolo II 
Court chose the doctrinal path of least resistance.318 
In sum, whether it is time for the Court to finally address this 
issue head on or once again choose to interpret the statute as not 
prohibiting the display is obviously for the Court to decide. How­
ever, the display of the rat balloon is legal from a statutory as well 
as a constitutional perspective. Much like handbilling and banner­
ing, it relies on the persuasiveness of its idea, not the coerciveness 
of the conduct.319 The displays alone-like banners-are stationary 
and are representative of the ideas of the union. The emotive im­
pact of those ideas has already been proven not to be a dispositive 
314. See supra Introduction. 
315. See generally Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439-40 (holding that the ambulatory 
patrol of labor protesters did not create a symbolic barrier); Rakoczy, supra note 173, at 
1649-50 (positing that picketing should be judged using a coercive standard, rather than 
the current archaic standard). 
316. Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975); Cohen v. Califor­
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214-20. 
317. Kohler, supra note 58, at 170 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf 
Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988)). It is 
important to note that recent decisions by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have also fol­
lowed the logic of Catholic Bishop to avoid serious constitutional questions in the realm 
of labor speech. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 437, 439; Overstreet, 409 F. 3d at 1209­
20. 
318. Kohler, supra note 58, at 170 (citing DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 575-76). 
319. See supra Part I.E.l (discussing DeBartolo II); see also Sheet Metal II, 491 
F.3d at 437-39; Overstreet, 409 F.3d 1214. 
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factor in the suppression of First Amendment rights.320 Suppres­
sion of those rights would raise serious constitutional issues.321 
D. 	 Proscribing the Display of the Rat Would Be Contrary to the 
Purposes and Policy Behind the Inception of the NLRA 
The impetus of the NLRA was to provide industrial peace and 
bring a semblance of equality to the American workforce.322 This 
was achieved by legalizing organized representation and collective 
bargaining for the outgunned workers.323 "[T]he growth of indus­
trial empires" has rendered "the bargaining power of the individual 
worker ... illusory." Thus, Congress found it is necessary to level 
the playing field. 324 As Professor Modjeska pointed out, "The use 
of economic weapons, force and pressure are essential ingredients 
of the free collective bargaining process recognized by our society 
and its labor policy. Much blood was shed by labor and manage­
ment over the establishment of the forgoing principles."325 To strip 
an already outnumbered and outgunned minority of a vital eco­
nomic tool because of a dormant constitutional interpretation is 
reprehensible, and it only furthers a disparate divide of economic 
power.326 
As previously mentioned, organized labor currently appears at 
its nadir since the codification of the NLRA.327 Union membership 
320. 	 See supra Part II.A. 
321. Finally, opponents of the display could argue that the speech is fraudulent 
because it gives the false impression of a rodent problem or inaccurately describes the 
labor dispute, and is thus not deserving of First Amendment protection. As mentioned 
previously however, the symbol of the rat is universally recognized as one of a labor 
dispute. Moreover, so long as the union accurately describes the party involved in the 
labor dispute, the message would not be perceived as fraudulent. See supra note 186 
and accompanying text. 
322. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1965). 
323. See supra Part LA.; see also Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1041. 
324. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1041. One is hard pressed not to wonder how 
Professor Modjeska would respond in the present era, given the rise of globalization, 
record corporate salaries and the technological impact on labor in 2006 as opposed to 
the 1930s. 
325. /d. at 1042. It also seems worth noting that Professor Modjeska was one of 
the NLRB attorneys who argued Tree Fruits in front of the Supreme Court. Id. at 1005, 
Biography. 
326. 	 See Michael C. Harper, The Consumers Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP 
v. Clairborne Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE LJ. 
409, 421 (1984) (proposing that the right of "[a]n individual's decision to join a con­
sumer boycott must be protected precisely because it enables the individual to affect 
the economy, not in spite of such effects"). Harper further posits this right to be as 
equally a moral right as a legal one. Id. 
327. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 2, 16. 
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is at its lowest point in the history of organized labor, real wages for 
the American worker are on the decline, and the current poverty 
rate for the richest nation in the world is an appalling thirty-seven 
million people.328 All the while, corporate profits, salaries, and pro­
ductivity rise at the expense and sweat of the American worker.329 
Is this what Congress envisioned when it enacted federal labor pol­
icy in the form of the NLRA? 
In 1984, Professor Modjeska posited that the fictional quality 
of the primary-secondary distinction "where the ostensibly neutral 
employer sells and profits from the sales of the struck product there 
is again a strong feeling, if not a principle that supports the proposi­
tion that the neutral is not in fact wholly uninvolved but has be­
come a party pro tanto."330 To limit a union's speech based on a 
fictional distinction would seriously undermine one of our nation's 
long-standing labor policies of aiding the American worker in the 
"socioeconomic struggle."331 This proposition is especially true 
given the multi-facility of enterprises, and globalization of our cur­
rent economic markets. Did Congress intend to allow "secondary" 
employers to exploit the American worker by hiring businesses that 
do not provide a living wage, health benefits, or do shoddy work­
manship while giving the complicit, once-removed employer a 
shield from economic pressure under § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)?332 
Such a policy is contrary to the spirit of the Act and should not 
be allowed to continue. At a time of disparate economic power 
between workers and corporations, unions should have the right to 
freely voice concerns and disseminate information concerning a la­
bor dispute. As Justice Murphy stated in Thornhill v. Alabama, 
"[I]n the circumstances of our times the dissemination of informa­
tion concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as 
within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Consti­
328. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 2006 HIGHLIGHTS, http://www.census. 
gov/hhes/www/poverty/poverty06/pov06hLhtmi (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
329. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 271, at 5 (detailing the disparity between cor­
porate salaries and American workers). 
330. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1047. Professor Modjeska's comments appear 
significantly prophetic given the advance of globalization, free trade, and the ability for 
employers to ship business to poorer counties where the labor costs are substantially 
less than in the United States. 
331. [d.; see Harper, supra note 326, at 420-21. 
332. With the advance of globalization, the primary-secondary distinction seems 
to have become a legal fiction. However, that is different argument, slated for a differ­
ent day. 
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tution. . . . The health of the present generation and of those yet 
unborn may depend on these matters ...."333 
To allow current labor law to remain ossified in the wake of 
drastic and global economic inequity, only reinforces the absence of 
justice and human rights within the American workforce.334 Sur­
rounded by a global economy it's easy to imagine and compare 
American workers to the overmatched island state of Melos, while 
the current corporate power structure assumes its position like that 
of the Athenian Army,335 which consumes and exploits the dispar­
ity of power between itself and workers for furtherance of its own 
ends. This inequality in economic power should not mandate un­
ions and workers to grant even more of an advantage to the fic­
tional "neutral" business by disallowing the dissemination of 
information of a labor dispute. Such a policy serves only to further 
an outdated, inflexible labor Act and perpetuates the ever-ex­
panding imbalance between corporations and the people who work 
for them. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing principles, the prohibition of the dis­
play of the rat at a secondary employer to disseminate the informa­
tion of a labor dispute contravenes the purpose and history of what 
the NLRA-at its roots-stands for.336 Allowing (and aiding) the 
disparity between business and labor to grow, only increases the 
likelihood that the state of labor relations could eventually regress 
to a point of economic instability, or at the very least significant 
disruption of the commercial flow of the United States. Moreover, 
there is a moral question that should guide the current labor juris­
prudence and policy. As Plutarch espoused, "an imbalance be­
tween rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all 
republics. "337 Therefore, to take away the few economic tools the 
worker has left, defeats the vision of the Act and sends society 
333. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940). 
334. Interrelating the concept that labor rights are inexorably connected with 
human rights. Further, "[v]iolation of those rights deny a person's humanity." James 
A. Gross, A Logical Extreme: Proposing Human Rights as the Foundation for Workers' 
Rights in the United States, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB, supra note 20, at 21, 23; Fraser, 
supra note 2, at 6-8; Harper, supra note 326, at 420-2l. 
335. THUCYDIDES, supra note 1, at 294-306. 
336. Block et aI., supra note 20, at 1-3. 
337. Robert H. Frank, The Spread Between the Rich and the Rest Has Been Grow­
ing for Decades. Current Policies Will Only Make It Worse, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 27, 
2005, at COl (quoting Plutarch). 
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closer to an apparition of justice where the strong do what they can 
and the weak grant what they must-despite the social, political, 
and moral consequences.338 
Richard J. Padykula * 
338. THUCYDIDES, supra note 1, at 294-306; see also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R.E. 
Allen trans., 2006). In The Republic, Plato marked the justice debate between Socrates 
and Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus contended that justice is an amorphous social illu­
sion. Since the Gods did not enforce any sense of justice in their world-justice must 
then be defined as the advantage of the stronger. Id. at 21. This is why laws primarily 
advance the position of those in power. Therefore, injustice is "stronger and more free 
and more masterful than justice." Id. at 22. Socrates countered with a position stating 
that justice (i.e., fairness and morality) is an important moral and noble social good that 
is essential for the betterment of society and the laws it produces. Id. at 23. This Note 
asserts that unless society recoils from the current brand of Thrasymachus-like injustice, 
our moral and socioeconomic stability will be in jeopardy-similar to those dark days 
prior to the Wagner Act. 
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